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ABSTRACT 
 
  The first chapter is an analysis of the rhetorical and transformative functions of 
language in Chan Buddhist rhetoric.  It begins with a critique of the traditional 
category of “mysticism” as used to describe religious traditions defined by a focus 
upon “mystical experience” as an extraordinary psychological state that is 
phenomenologically similar across traditions.  It proposes a different typology for 
identifying these types of traditions that refers to their similar rhetorical idiom of 
contemplation and transformation of consciousness.  The case of Chan Buddhism is 
examined to illustrate how this contemplative idiom functions rhetorically to create 
and contest authority, and how it works to frame an alternate conception of reality and 
lead the practitioner to instantiate that conception by transforming his apprehension of 
reality. 
  The second chapter is an exposition and examination of the religious 
phenomenon of alchemy, specifically as manifested in the traditions of India and 
China.  It argues that alchemy is not a single, continuous global phenomenon, but 
rather a peculiar set of instances of contemplative language applied to certain 
commonly observed material processes.  It concludes that each case of alchemy is an 
independent use of a peculiar idiom to express specific cultural values, but that the 
parallel material processes involved necessarily produce certain similarities in each 
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CHAPTER ONE 




The study of mysticism is dominated by questions about the constitution of the 
mystical experience.  These questions are further divided by preoccupations with what 
is truly mystical and what is the nature of experience.  Most theorists assume, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that the sine qua non of mysticism is the relatively rare event 
in which individual consciousness appears to merge in radical unity with some 
absolute principle of the universe.   
  The problem with this approach is that it places undue emphasis on what is 
really only one part of very rich traditions of religious expression.  In locating the 
“essence” of mysticism (or even religion in general) in private experience, 
unapproachable by the outside observer, the external social and cultural facets of the 
tradition are obscured.  In this essay I hope to convey a sense of “mystical experience” 
as the total socio-cultural process of contemplation and transformation lived by the 
mystic.  This process takes place entirely within the social, cultural and political 
matrix of the mystic’s tradition and may or may not include a climactic experience of 
unitive consciousness.  It certainly does include the total life experience and amalgam 
of factors that inform and transform the practitioner’s apprehension and appreciation 
of reality, as well as the substantive effects that flow out into the world of human 
relationships from the values articulated by that process of change.  
  Because the idiom of contemplation and transformation of the adept’s 
conception of reality plays a significant role in the articulation of many cultural values 
in these traditions, I will adopt the convention of calling them contemplative traditions   2 
 
rather than mystical.  I use the term contemplation to mean a sustained and intentional 
process of mental organization that seeks to reorient the practitioner’s mind to a 
particular apprehension of reality that is presented as qualitatively different from his or 
her mundane understanding of the world.
1  This moniker is descriptive of the more 
salient socio-cultural features of the tradition, while at the same time avoiding the 
narrowly conceived and often pejorative denotations of mysticism.   
We have come to use the word mysticism to describe this class of traditions 
because the word mystery—from which the term mysticism is derived—denotes a 
concept that seems to defy intellectual understanding or even positive definition—
much the same as the so-called “mystical experience.”  Working from the account 
given by Michel de Certeau, Richard King notes that the Greek root mūstikos in the 
context of early and medieval Christian theology was a multivalent term referring to 
the hidden revelation of God in scripture, liturgy, and contemplation.
2  The Protestant 
ideals of the transparency and literal truth of scripture eventually gave rise to the 
notion of the mystical as a separate genre of allegorical literature.
3  As empirical, 
objective science defined itself against subjective religious speculation, the mystical 
became wholly associated with the religious sphere.
4  In the modern era, defined as it 
is by Enlightenment values, this distinction—between religious (mystical) and 
scientific, subjective and objective, public and private—was deepened and adopted in 
the power dynamics that excluded religion from the public sphere.
5  Located squarely 
within the realm of the private, mysticism subsequently became associated almost 
                                                 
1 That is, reality with a small r.  If there is a Reality, it is not my place here to prove what it is, and I am 
concerned only with reality as constructed by cultural consensus (which may, incidentally, be presented 
as Reality). 
2 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion:  Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘the Mystic East,’ (London:  
Routledge, 1999), 14-15. 
3 Ibid., 15. 
4 Ibid., 17-18 and passim. 
5 Ibid., 20-24.   3 
 
exclusively with the private experience of extraordinary states of consciousness.  
Subsequent scholars have therefore focused on the “mystical event” itself, variously 
defined, as the most interesting aspect of contemplative traditions.   
King mounts a powerful and persuasive campaign against our privileging the 
phenomenology of private experience in the study of religion.  There is no way for a 
scholar to know the character of any individual’s private inner experience except his 
own, so King’s point is well taken.  The way scholars of mysticism have used the term 
experience is also problematic.  Robert Sharf notes that private awareness of some 
sensation or mental phenomenon is only one possible definition of experience, and just 
as valid a definition is the simple fact of participating in or living through some 
situation.
6  In this sense, the experience of an individual could be the sum of her lived 
interactions with material and social situations.  Experience thus defined does not 
privilege private introspective states, but rather recognizes the various social and 
cultural realities in a given context.  It recognizes that the quality of experience is a 
product of both the material realities of the socio-historical complex and the system of 
cultural valences that brings meaning and coherence to those realities.  I will therefore 
use this definition of experience throughout this essay.  I will also argue that this more 
public understanding of experience can still be accurately characterized as 
transcendent in many of the same ways that private experience can be. 
At this point we should ask if experience—however it be defined—is an 
appropriate concept to use in analyzing contemplative traditions?  It is true that even 
in the more comprehensive meaning of broad experience given above, the experiencer 
has some private inner sensation of what her participation in or living through an event 
is like.  This sensation, however, need not be individually accounted for to give an 
                                                 
6 Robert H. Sharf, “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience,” Numen 47 (1995): 
265.  See also Robert H. Sharf, “Experience,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. 
Taylor, 94-116 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998).   4 
 
adequate understanding of the experience.  Further, even though the experiencer is, 
theoretically, an individual, he or she is not a unique individual, but only the 
abstraction of any given individual existing within a given context.  Since the 
theoretical experiencer could really be any person existing in the context under 
examination, and because the subjective sensual quality of the experience is not under 
examination, the experience is eminently public, and cannot therefore, “[elude] public 
scrutiny.”
7   
By using this broad definition of experience I do not deny the fact that certain 
individuals may encounter extraordinary inner states, but rather I avoid making those 
inaccessible states the focus of my inquiry.  I will characterize the contemplative 
project in general as a process of transforming experience from a mode informed by 
the adept’s socio-cultural “webs of significance” (to use Weber’s terminology) to one 
informed by the webs of significance generated and sustained by the rhetoric, ritual 
and doctrine of his tradition.  The realms of meaning and value associated with this 
new mode of experience may be (and indeed usually are) very different from the 
adept’s original conventional mode of experience—even to the point of making him 
seem to be operating on a different plane of reality than his unenlightened fellows.  In 
fact, if the values and meanings imparted by the tradition’s conception of 
enlightenment or spiritual awakening are constructed specifically and conscientiously 
as transcending conventional modes of awareness, and if the contemplative adept 
succeeds in integrating these values and meanings as ordering principles of his 
experience, then we can reasonably say that the new experience is indeed transcendent.   
I should also note that I do not assume that every person involved in a 
contemplative tradition is necessarily engaged directly with the “contemplative 
project.”  I define a contemplative tradition as such only by its use of the idiom of 
                                                 
7 Sharf, “Buddhist Modernism,” 265.   5 
 
contemplative transformation, as well as the general cultural resonance of such an 
idiom.  In order for this idiom to be invested with such deep significance, however, I 
contend that there must also be a certain consensus within the tradition that these 
practices are “real”—that is, that transformation can and does (or at least did at some 
point) happen, that it can be sought, and that it is an ideal that commands a high social 
or cultural value.  In this respect it is important to understand how a tradition 
conceives of the potential for transformation, the means by which transformation can 
be effected, and the meaning and effects of that transformation.  These values are 
often articulated in terms of personal consciousness, so it will often be necessary to 
examine them on those terms.   
  A contemplative tradition itself defines the pattern of meaning and value that 
orders transformed experience, and the tradition also defines the scope of authority 
accorded to those who are verified as having succeeded in the transformation.  The 
articulation of these definitions is thus an important site for contesting and creating 
authority.  Because these are public methods of authorization, the most important 
factor in determining an individual’s level of attainment is public consensus that he is 
so accomplished.  This is why Robert Sharf notes that, “in traditional Chinese 
Buddhist literature, [terms analogous to Japanese satori or kensho] are used to denote 
the full comprehension and appreciation of central Buddhist tenets such as emptiness, 
Buddha-nature, or dependent origination.”
8  This appraisal of terms that were 
understood in previous scholarly literature as denoting extraordinary inner experience 
requires only that the adept fully understand the implications of Buddhist doctrine, and 
not that he have some private experience that provides empirical verification of that 
doctrine.   
                                                 
8 Ibid., 249.   6 
 
Sharf also characterizes what was once conceived of as meditative practice in 
terms of ritual instead.  He asserts that, “traditional Chan and Zen practice was 
oriented not towards engendering ‘enlightenment’ experiences, but rather to perfecting 
the ritual performance of Buddhahood.”
9  It is important to note that Sharf does not 
seek to portray traditional Buddhist monastic practice as “hollow” or “degenerate” 
ritualization of the Buddha’s actual contemplative endeavor.  Instead, he allows that 
the ritual recitation of prescriptive meditation texts served as an “instantiation of 
Buddhahood.”
10  If Sharf accurately describes such ritual as instantiation, ritual is then 
the representation of an actual instance of Buddhahood.
11  While this may not 
necessarily entail an extraordinary personal experience, it does entail an articulation of 
Buddhist soteriology.  In a contemplative tradition as I have defined it—like 
Buddhism for example—this soteriology is understood in terms of the rhetoric of 
transformation. 
Doctrine and practice—the effective means by which a tradition articulates its 
definition of transformation—must, therefore, be appreciated in light of the dynamics 
of power within the tradition.  Likewise, the rhetoric of transcendence, ineffability, 
and noesis that sculpt the features and significance of transformed experience must 
also be seen in this light.  By moving away from subjective sensual experience as the 
locus of religion we are accepting religion as an integral part of the social and cultural 
fabric of lived experience, and recognizing that it affects many other aspects of that 
experience just as it is itself so affected. 
  The class of traditions to be labeled contemplative are best conceived as ones 
whose ostensive goals are broad experiences of reality ordered in a way that is 
qualitatively different than that of ordinary experience.  This difference allows a new 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 243. 
10 Ibid., 258. 
11 Oxford New American Dictionary, s.v. “Instantiation.”   7 
 
mode of understanding and is also beyond the scope of ordinary conceptualization 
(though, as we will see, not beyond the scope of conceptualization in general).  The 
experience is therefore accurately characterized by its noetic and ineffable qualities.  
The traditions which seek these transformations all represent established technologies 
by which normal modes of conceptualization are deconstructed and replaced with 
modes that the traditions themselves effectively shape and inform.  The articulation of 
the meaning of transformation itself as well as the ordering principles of transformed 
experience are malleable, contestable issues that admit to evaluation in terms of their 
total socio-cultural significance.  We can rightfully group these traditions together 
because of the similar rhetorical and practical trope of contemplative transformation.  
The private mental experience of individuals within these traditions may or may not be 
phenomenally similar to the experience of participants in other traditions, but the issue 
of their psycho-physical similarity is irrelevant to discussions of cultural 
significance.
12  The issue of these psycho-physical effects is of great relevance to our 
understanding of the brain and the processes of cognition in general, but for that very 
reason it belongs more to the disciplines of neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy 
of mind than to the history of religions.     
  It is my goal in this essay, therefore, to provide a characterization of the 
contemplative project that can appreciate its goals and methods as an elegant, 
congruous whole, rather than a baffling mystery.  I will apply this scheme to some 
features of Chan Buddhism to illustrate how Chan can be fruitfully understood as a 
contemplative tradition.  I will begin by presenting a brief review of the most 
                                                 
12 Irrelevant, that is, until claims of identity or authority are made on the basis of purported similarity 
between private experiences.  These discussions, like many discussions that locate religion purely 
within the realm of personal experience, are essentially theological and therefore represent subjects for 
analysis by scholars of religion, but are not themselves instances of such scholarly analysis.  For more 
on this point, see Russell McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers, (Albany:  State University of New York 
Press, 2001).   8 
 
important Western scholarly literature on mysticism, and extract from it the features 
most salient to the discussion.  As Richard King and others have shown, much of the 
work in this area is problematic, but if we approach it critically, armed with a less 
value-laden concept of experience, the material can provide useful information.  I will 
then analyze the contemplative project in terms of its rhetorical features of 
transformation and ineffability, and draw appropriate examples from the case of Chan 
Buddhism.   
 
The Jamesian Paradigm 
 
  Much of the important Western philosophical work done on mysticism begins 
with reference to the account William James gives in his Varieties of Religious 
Experience.  James, like many of his contemporaries, believed that the basis of 
religion could be found in the individual’s experience thereof.  To be fair, James 
centered his work on varieties of religious experience for a reason.  He held that there 
is not one distinctly and uniquely religious emotion or feeling, nor is there one 
distinctly and uniquely religious object of such an emotion.
13  He also acknowledged 
the exterior world of religious institutions, but for the purposes of the lectures which 
make up the Varieties confines himself to a definition of religion as, “the feelings, acts, 
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they consider to be the divine.”
14  The 
divine, furthermore, is not necessarily understood as a personal deity, but rather the 
general placeholder for that which prompts the aforementioned feelings, acts, and 
experiences. 
                                                 
13 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience:  Centenary Edition, (London: Routledge, 
2002), 27. 
14 Ibid., 29-30.     9 
 
More recent scholarship in the field has shown us that this focus on individual 
experience is more the product of Western Protestant prerogatives of personal 
conviction than of phenomenological actuality.  Proudfoot, Sharf and King especially 
have been active in disabusing scholars of this outmoded primacy of individual 
experience.
15  As I noted above, Richard King has called into question the validity of 
the very category of mysticism on these grounds.  He and other scholars have 
successfully illustrated the way in which Christianity retroactively constructed a 
mystical tradition by applying the typology of transcendent inner awareness to an 
array of saints and Church fathers, now regarded as the “great mystics.”
16  It is 
therefore very problematic to appropriate ideas about mysticism into a discussion of 
contemplative traditions. 
It would be irresponsible to simply throw out all of the scholarship conducted 
on mysticism, and there is much that can be confidently drawn from a cautious reading 
of this work.  For instance, although figures like Meister Eckhardt and St. Theresa of 
Avila may not have self-consciously belonged to a cohesive Christian contemplative 
tradition, the fact remains that the literature they produced made use of a 
contemplative idiom, and that is enough to qualify them for membership in such an 
analytic typology.  Furthermore, this category is merely an interpretive tool, used to 
understand how these traditions articulated meaning and value in broadly similar ways.  
It is not part of a rhetoric of marginalization or devaluation as was often the case with 
the category of mysticism.  Scholarship on mysticism that cites the examples of 
Meister Eckhardt or St. Theresa of Avila, then, can still be utilized in so far as it 
elucidates these figures’ use or understanding of contemplative tropes.  What will not 
                                                 
15 See Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985); Sharf and 
King, op. cit. 
16 King, Orientalism, 17-18, citing Certeau.   10 
 
be useful in such accounts is any evaluation made of the quality of Eckhardt’s or 
Theresa’s interior mental states. 
Furthermore, although religious traditions are not reducible to private mental 
states, religious traditions are nevertheless composed of individuals—and those 
individuals do have private mental states.  In order to understand the cultural situation 
and historical trajectory of a tradition or the multifarious significance of a certain 
religious phenomenon, it is often necessary to understand the “moods and 
motivations” (to use Geertz’s terminology) of individuals.  This is not to say that one 
must account for the emotions and desires of any particular individual, only that one 
must account for the significance of the phenomenon under investigation in terms of 
its function and significance vis-à-vis the moods and motivations of individuals in 
general, insofar as those moods and motivations constitute the lived reality of the 
tradition.  Although this terminology and orientation is taken from the work of 
Clifford Geertz
17, my methodological stance is more closely informed by the work of 
Jonathan Z. Smith. 
Smith describes religion as a, “mode of constructing worlds of meaning,” and 
religious studies as the humanistic project of interpreting those worlds of meaning.
18  
What I have termed contemplative traditions possess two distinct worlds of meaning:  
the conventional world experienced in terms of contextual socio-cultural meaning, and 
the “transcendent” world experienced in terms of the values instantiated by doctrine 
and practice.  Since the transcendent world is exalted as a soteriological goal, the 
transformation from one perspective to the other is a mark of religious authority.  The 
two worlds of meaning also coexist within the same material context and as such the 
concepts that define each will necessarily be interconnected.  The doctrine and 
                                                 
17 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
18 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), 290.   11 
 
practice of the contemplative tradition serves to draw the boundaries between these 
two worlds of meaning, but the form and development of that tradition is necessarily 
influenced by (and indeed influences) its socio-cultural context.  As we will see, 
however, this fact does not preclude the transcendent world from being practically 
transcendent. 
  The individualist nature of James’ study leads him to search for, “the essence 
of religious experiences . . . in those religious experiences which are most one-sided, 
exaggerated, and intense.”
19  He eventually comes to regard the mystical experience as 
the religious experience par excellence for these very reasons.  He identifies four 
essential characteristics of all mystical experiences:  ineffability, noetic quality, 
transiency, and passivity.  Although James’ project is informed by the problematic 
notions of religion as personal feeling and a cohesive mystical tradition, his 
observation of the primary qualities of noesis and ineffability in mystical experience is 
apt.  There is indeed rhetoric of ineffability and noetic quality in contemplative 
discourse, but we must examine these features as cultural and linguistic elements 
rather than phenomenological descriptions. 
  Although James did not consider himself a mystic, and indeed remarks, “my 
own constitution shuts me out from their [mystical states’] enjoyment almost 
entirely,”
20 he did have some vaguely similar experiences with nitrous oxide.  These 
experiences led him to the unswerving conviction that, “our normal waking 
consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of 
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie 
potential forms of consciousness entirely different.”
21  He also characterizes this 
potential form of consciousness as producing a feeling, an insight, “as if the opposites 
                                                 
19 James, Varieties, 40.   
20 Ibid., 294. 
21 Ibid., 300.   12 
 
of the world . . . were melted into unity.”
22  This characterization is significant because 
it belies much of what is important for understanding the function of the transcendent 
state.  James tends to think of altered states of consciousness as distinctly different 
worlds, but there is really no need for such a strict ontological division.  What James 
perceives as a different form of consciousness—one that is somehow ontologically 
different than normal consciousness—is simply a different way of experiencing the 
world using the same consciousness.  In his case, this may be due to a change in neural 
function due to the effects of nitrous oxide, or in the case of a contemplative 
practitioner it could be due to a change in the structure of her entire conceptual 
apparatus.  James’ case, however, does not bear directly on this discussion because it 
is purely an interior, chemically induced state—whereas the contemplative case is an 
example of broad, identifiable changes in patterns of signification.  What is important 
to take from James is the notion that the transcendent world of meaning is indeed 
different from the mundane world of meaning, and that it is different in such a way as 
to be justifiably described in terms of its noetic content and ineffability.  That is, if the 
transformative project of a contemplative tradition is specifically oriented towards 
instantiating systems of significance that are incompatible—logically or otherwise—
with ordinary systems of significance, then such a mode of experience would have to 
escape the grasp of ordinary, logically consistent language.  Likewise, it naturally 
would engender a feeling of special insight because the adept’s transformed 
apprehension or appreciation of reality would be fundamentally different than it 
previously was. 
  James effectively set the modern standard for what is to be considered 
mysticism or mystical experience, and most subsequent work was devoted to further 
classifying mysticism so defined into various types or “genres.”  Scholars like Evelyn 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 301.   13 
 
Underhill, Rudolph Otto and R. C. Zaehner
23 followed this pattern and as such I will 
not engage their work directly other than to note their place in the scholarly tradition 
of ascribing the essence of mysticism to narrow experience.  The work of W. T. 
Stace
24 has been very influential in the study of mysticism, and although much of it 
has now been discredited, most recent studies in mysticism at least make reference to 
his conception of mysticism.  Stace’s enduring legacy would seem to be his 
classification of mysticism into the two typologies of introvertive or extrovertive 
mysticism.  These categories refer to the differences in phenomenal quality Stace 
perceives in different accounts of extraordinary personal experiences.  Although this 
typology has been very influential, it does not help us understand the contextual reality 
of contemplation, so it is not necessary to explore the argument at length.  More recent 
efforts of scholars in religious studies will be more helpful. 
 
Language and Its Use in Contemplative Traditions 
 
  Much of the recent debate amongst scholars of mysticism centers on the 
epistemological status of the so-called mystical event.  The major bone of contention 
is the question of whether the experience of a mystical event is mediated or 
unmediated by the mystic’s previous sociolinguistic background, conceptual 
framework, and religious intentions.  The brunt of this debate focuses on the 
phenomenological character of mystical states of consciousness, and is thus subject to 
the same criticism of such a focus on narrow experience raised by scholars like 
Richard King and Robert Sharf.  Fortunately, this area of scholarship does engage 
                                                 
23 See Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism:  A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual 
Consciousness, (New York: Meridian, 1955); Rudolph Otto, Mysticism East and West, (New York: 
Collier, 1962); and R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961). 
24 See Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 1960).   14 
 
more fully with the contextual reality of mystical traditions, even if its focus on private 
experience is misplaced.  As such, it has many implications for the role of language in 
contemplative traditions, so it is here that I will begin my analysis. 
  The two rival factions in the heated debate over mediation are the 
contextualists and the decontextualists.
25  The contextualists, whose most outspoken 
proponent is Steven Katz, hold that there is a plurality of mystical experiences and that 
each is constructed within the socio-cultural milieu of the mystic.  The mystic’s 
relevant contextual circumstances can be literally any and all experiences she has had 
prior to the experience of the mystical state, but the most important are her tradition’s 
conception of reality and its soteriological doctrines, all of which function 
linguistically.
26  The decontextualists, whose most outspoken proponent is Robert 
Forman, hold that the key event of mystical consciousness (often referred to as the 
Pure Consciousness Event or PCE) is absolutely devoid of all mental objects and 
therefore cannot be mediated in any way.  Additionally, because the nature of 
consciousness itself is presumably an identical characteristic of all human minds, the 
experience of pure consciousness must also be identical in every occurrence, thus 
reviving the perennialist position of Huxley and others. 
  The main thesis of the contextualist school is argued most forcefully in Steven 
Katz’s 1979 essay, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism.”  Katz characterizes 
this essay as a, “plea for the recognition of differences,” and attempts to bring into 
greater relief the important contextual differences among the several traditions 
                                                 
25 These groups of scholars are also popularly referred to as the constructivists and perennial 
philosophers, respectively.  I use the terms with which Steven Katz and Robert Forman self identify 
(Katz, Mysticism and Language, 5, 34 n. 9; Forman, The Innate Capacity, 1998, 3).  Forman also 
endorses the term, “perennial psychology,” but I prefer the symmetry of contextualism/decontextualism 
(Forman, The Innate Capacity, 6). 
26 Steven Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, 
ed. Steven Katz, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), 62 and passim.  For a discussion of some 
possible pre-linguistic mediating factors see Robert Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, (Albany: 
State Univ. of New York Press, 1999), 55-79.   15 
 
commonly lumped together as mystical.
27  This is a worthwhile project in that it 
begins to address the need for contextual detail in the study of such traditions, but 
unfortunately Katz’s focus still rests squarely on the narrow experience of mystics.  
By emphasizing the constructed nature of that experience, however, Katz opens the 
door for a more general theory of broad experience in contemplative traditions. 
Katz’s main complaint against the previous treatments of mysticism is that 
they do not make a clear enough distinction between interpretation and experience.  
Katz holds the strong Neo-Kantian epistemological stance that the very nature of 
experience is that it is interpreted: 
 
“There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.  Neither mystical 
experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, 
nor any grounds for believing, that they are unmediated.  That is to say 
all experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself 
available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways.”
28 
 
This is a strong statement, and one for which Katz has received due criticism.  As 
elaborated in his essay, Katz’s approach leads to the conclusion that individual 
instances of mystical consciousness are not only formed by the “starting problems” 
and spiritual goals of the mystic’s religious tradition, but that the experience itself is 
completely shaped by the interpretive mechanism of the mystic’s mind.  This account, 
however, is problematic. 
  Katz unqualifiedly states that the data drawn from mystics’ reports of their 
experiences give no indication, “nor any grounds for believing, that they are 
unmediated.”  As Richard King and Donald Rothberg have noted, this approach is 
problematic because it imposes a modern Neo-Kantian view of knowledge and the 
                                                 
27 Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” 25. 
28 Ibid., 26.   16 
 
mind onto traditions quite distant in both space and time.
29  Although Katz finds no 
grounds for believing any experience is unmediated, he also provides no evidence for 
believing that his epistemology is universally standard.  As Richard King notes, the 
rise of post-Kantian epistemologies in the West has its own historical causes, and is 
just as much a product of cultural power dynamics as any other conceptual category.
30  
According to the tenets of social constructivism, moreover, our modern post-Kantian 
conception of knowledge and reality is just as constructed as any other—and therefore 
just as contingent and relative.   
The decontextualists, however, argue that there is in fact good reason to 
believe that the mystics’ experiences are unmediated.  Robert Forman does not reject a 
Neo-Kantian epistemology in general, but describes the common process among 
mystics of deconstructing their automated interpretive responses and systematically 
“forgetting” linguistic structures that order their perception.
31  If we believe that our 
ordinary consciousness is fundamentally ordered by these structures (à la Katz’s 
account), then it stands to reason that their removal would yield a supernormal 
consciousness void of all such distinctions.  In Forman’s account, such a contentless 




  Some twenty years earlier, Katz commented on this issue by saying this 
process was more accurately described as a reconstruction rather than a deconstruction 
of consciousness.
33  The meaning Katz had in mind seems to be that the deconstructive 
process seems to deconstruct the mediating apparatus, but because he holds that there 
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can be no experience without such mediation, in reality a new apparatus must be 
constructed out of the religious aspirations and expectations of the adept.  The 
problem with this account is that it assumes a ubiquitous and inescapable 
epistemology of mediation, which many contemplative traditions specifically reject.  
Donald Evans has argued that, because scholars do not have access to the private 
mental phenomena of mystics, it is impossible for them to either confirm or deny the 
possibility of a “pure” or unmediated experience of consciousness.
34  Katz himself 
uses the inaccessibility of interior mental states to argue that mystics cannot 
legitimately confirm the immediacy of other mystics’ experiences, and that it is thus 
unreasonable to make cross-cultural identifications of mystical phenomena.
35  Katz 
does concede, however, that the mystic’s reconstructed consciousness is a, “new, 
unusual, and perhaps altogether more interesting form of conditioned-contextual 
consciousness.”
36  Because Katz simply assumes that there are no unmediated 
experiences, he can dogmatically proclaim that this transformed consciousness is still 
governed in some way by mediating categories.  I contend, however, along with a 
great many of Katz’s critics, that there is no reason to privilege a culturally-
conditioned neo-Kantian epistemology to the complete exclusion of other 
epistemologies, especially when contemplative traditions often go to great lengths to 
articulate their own theories of knowledge.  However, the epistemological status of 
“mystical consciousness” is not what is at issue in this essay.  Instead, I suggest that 
we can use Katz’s description of the mystical program as reconstruction more 
effectively if we remove it from his given context of narrow experience.  This yields a 
picture of the contemplative project not as reconstruction but as transformation from a 
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conditioned-contextual apprehension of reality to a different kind of apprehension that 
is defined by context.
37  This assessment leaves open the possibility that any given 
practitioner of such a contemplative path may have a personal experience of pure 
consciousness, but does not assert a need for such a narrow experience.  Instead, the 
practitioner needs only to integrate his tradition’s practical and doctrinal conception of 
transcendent reality (be it mediated or unmediated) into his own apprehension of 
reality.  
  If the new appreciation of reality is built on the beliefs and concepts of the 
adept’s tradition, and if these beliefs and concepts are themselves conventional 
linguistic structures, how could they possibly give rise to a transcendental ordering of 
consciousness?  The answer is that transcendence need not be absolute, but can simply 
be transcendence as conceived by the heritage of the tradition.  Each tradition 
articulates its own definition of transcendence, as well as its own methods for 
achieving that goal and the criteria for acknowledging who has achieved it.  Robert 
Forman points to the apparent commonality of performative language in mystical 
traditions as affecting the deconstruction of cognitive mechanisms.
38  This may be the 
case in some instances, but the issue is really one for cognitive science.  Performative 
language in this context does not have to deconstruct cognitive mechanisms to be 
performative; it really only needs to articulate the features of a tradition’s conception 
of transcendent reality, as well as all the marks of the person who has realized it.  This 
kind of language can be called performative in the sense that it performs a certain 
function, but that function does not need to be as radical as Forman’s concept of 
cognitive deconstruction. 
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Frederick Streng argues that it is a mistake to assume that mystical language is 
always meant to describe some subjective state or objective referent, and that this 
language often has a transformative function, as well.  That is, it functions to “purify” 
the mind of the adept, or to, “evoke a change in the attitudes and mechanisms of 
apprehension.”
39  The changes evoked by such language, furthermore, do not 
necessarily entail a complete rejection or invalidation of concepts per se, but do evoke 
important changes in fundamental concepts:   
 
“The deepest significance of the mystical transformation is that it is not 
only a psychological or epistemological shift, but an ontological shift.  
When one is united with the very Being of life, or when one attains the 
suchness of all things, a person purifies one’s perception, will, and 




Streng makes it clear in the beginning of his essay that he believes there is some sort 
of “spiritual realm,”
41 so his conception of being “united with the very Being of life,” 
is certainly different from my conception of the contemplative transformation as a 
shift in culturally constructed patterns of significance.  Nonetheless, his description 
here belies an important aspect of that transformation:  namely, one who is so 
transformed affects change in perception, will, and intention in such a way that the 
change is made manifest in his behavior and confirmed by his community.  Although 
we do not have access to the phenomenological character of such an adept’s inner 
experience, we do have access to the public evidence of the community’s judgment of 
him.  The religious community’s standards for what constitutes contemplative 
achievement are the practical definition for what contemplative transformation is.  The 
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community’s articulation of this definition, moreover, encompasses not only the 
descriptive use of language, but also the transformative or performative use. 
Ninian Smart occupies an interesting role in the contextualist/deconstextualist 
debate.  He has contributed articles to all four of Katz’s edited volumes, but he often 
makes statements that are decidedly perennialist in tone.
42  His comments on mystical 
language, therefore, provide an insightful hybrid view of the issues. 
  In his article, “The Purification of Consciousness,” in Katz’s second edited 
volume, Smart discusses how the mystical via negativa allows the mystic to replace 
his normal inner flow of consciousness with a sort of blank slate, devoid of conscious 
content.  Such a state is inherently not describable simply because there is nothing in it 
to be described.  Nevertheless, “to say that a mental state is blank and thus not to be 
described is to describe it.”
43  He also stresses, however, that the blank is a, “blank in 
context,” and not necessarily only blank.
44  Furthermore, “even the empty can be 
analyzed, since its context and meaning are not themselves opaque and simple.”
45  
Smart engages in a more detailed discussion of this topic in his earlier work The 
Philosophy of Religion where he adds the potential sense of mystical language as 
indicative in the same way that the phrase, “look at that,” accompanied by a pointing 
finger is indicative:   
 
it might be plausible to think of religious activities, and symbols, as 
functioning rather like complex fingers—pointing towards the religious 
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ultimate . . . Taking this simile very rigorously, it might then be 
possible to have a reference for religious language and activity without 
allowing that that which is referred to is describable.
46 
 
In this account Smart includes more than just language, but that is not problematic.  
The mystic’s total religious experience—including activity as well as language—
would come to bear on the formation of a transformed apprehension of reality.  The 
new consciousness would also necessarily be completely capable of utilizing language 
in a conventional sense, but the meaning of language for the mystic would presumably 
be very different because his context would also be different.  Frederick Streng 
discusses this issue at length in his article in the first Katz volume and notes that, “the 
shift from conventional to mystical awareness . . . expresses a new attitude or 
temperament which is more than, but inclusive of, intellect and ideas.”
47  Nevertheless, 
if the tradition’s conception of transcendent awareness is designed to transcend the 
conceptual patterns of language, the linguistic devices that the mystic uses to describe 
his experiences will be difficult to understand in a mundane context.  It is completely 
reasonable then, that he may describe his experiences as ineffable or paradoxical.  As 
we have learned from Ninian Smart, however, these confusing utterances can actually 
be very meaningful.  Paradox is an especially complex rhetorical feature that can have 
many different valences in a given context. 
  At this point we may ask:  why is it important to establish the legitimacy of the 
contemplative transformation as an actual process rather than mere rhetoric?  
Although we need not be concerned with the phenomenal character of an individual’s 
narrow experience of such a transformation, it is important to note that such a 
transformation can, at least theoretically, take place.  In order to analyze the meaning 
of the idiom of contemplative transformation and to avoid ideological bankruptcy, we 
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must admit that a tradition can reasonably consider such a transformation a viable 
reality, even if it maintains that it is a near-impossible goal.  Robert Sharf criticizes the 
idea of valorizing extraordinary interior states by citing ethnographic evidence that 
practicing Buddhists are rarely able to perform the psychic feats often attributed to 
meditation virtuosos—nor do they realistically expect to do so.
48  He also notes, 
however, that many of the informants maintain that such feats are indeed possible, but 
that only the most venerated of their teachers or religious forebears were able to 
accomplish them.  Although these informants may, as Sharf claims, “ignore the 
disjunction between the textual ideal on the one hand, and the lived contingencies of 
religious practice on the other,”
49 such contemplative ability is still treated as a mark 
of authority and valorized as an ideal.  To deny the very possibility of the fruits of 
mental discipline and reduce the contemplative idiom to mere rhetoric is to do 
violence to the traditions in which it plays an integral role.   
In a response to Steven Katz’s argument discussed above, Sallie King notes 
that, “the assumption that there are no unmediated experiences also negates the very 
foundation of yoga, most of Buddhism, large segments of Hinduism, and 
philosophical Taoism.”
50  The epistemic status of experience is not Sharf’s issue, but 
his criticism is similarly threatening to Buddhism.  While Sharf admirably seeks to 
undermine the naïve assumption that Buddhism is all about altered states of 
consciousness, he also comes dangerously close to distorting the significance of the 
contemplative idiom within the tradition.  To be sure, the rhetoric of ineffability and 
transcendence is used in many ways that are more closely related to issues of authority, 
power and legitimacy than traditional treatments of mysticism would admit, but it 
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would be imprudent to overcompensate for this lack by completely rejecting the 
possibility of a real transformative use of this language.  Sharf may be quite right in 
asserting that, in most Buddhist contexts, meditative or transformative rhetoric does 
not function ostensibly, but this is not to deny that it functions ostensibly at all, or that 
it derives its cultural currency from its ostensive function. 
  In evaluating contemplative traditions, we must therefore explore all of the 
possible meanings the rhetoric of ineffability and paradox may have.  When it 
functions as a site for disputations of authority, that should not obscure any other 
function it may have in transforming the way in which practitioners interact with the 
world, and vice versa.  Indeed, contemplative transformation is often the context of 
meaning within which these utterances have value in terms of authority and 
community in the first place.  Ineffability and paradox are perhaps most difficult to 
understand in their transformative or performative uses.  In this context, one must 
allow for the possibility of an understanding of reality that is not framed by the 
modern Western worldview.   
Because much of this type of language is quite confusing, mysticism has been 
accused of irrationalism.  Frits Staal argues that Western culture and scholarship came 
to regard mysticism as the realm of the irrational because of a greater trend toward 
couching religion and spirituality in general in terms of the irrational.
51  He 
summarizes the development of these attitudes: 
 
“Among the great religions of mankind, Christianity stresses faith and 
irrationalism to an extent that the others (including Islam) never even 
considered.  During the middle ages, Christian philosophers produced 
valiant attempts to give a rational account of the Christian articles of 
faith.  But on the whole, in the area of Western religion, irrationalism 
prevailed.  And so the modern Western opinion with regard to religion, 
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whether friendly or unfriendly, is that it squarely falls within the 
domain of the irrational.”
52 
 
Staal further argues that mysticism in particular (and the humanities in general) is a 
completely appropriate area for rational inquiry, and that there is no need to appeal to 
alleged irrationality in order to understand the complex issues of mysticism.
53  Usually 
those who argue for the existence of some kind of realm of irrationality in which to 
locate religion are theologians interested either in defending religion against rational 
secular critique or who perhaps somehow still regard the quest for rational knowledge 
as sinful pride.
54  Staal conceives of mysticism as a process of rational inquiry in the 
same vein as empirical science in that it is concerned with separating appearance from 
reality.
55  That is, science seeks to explain how things work, not just how they appear, 
and Staal believes that mysticism is the same way, but that the social sciences (and 
social scientific approaches to religion) tend to be concerned with appearance alone.  
The point of all this is that we can indeed approach language which is said to be 
“beyond reason” in a rational way.  
While engaging with such conceptually difficult language, Walter Stace argued 
that the mystics’ use of paradoxical language is not necessarily problematic, and is 
indeed entirely applicable to their experiences.  He takes this kind of language at face 
value and insists, “that the paradoxes are flat logical contradictions.”
56  He then 
suggests and subsequently refutes several theories of how the mystics’ language of 
paradox could be explained to become sensible.  G. K. Pletcher restates them: 
 
(1) The theory that the paradoxes are merely verbal, used by the mystic to 
enhance his writings; 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 23. 
53 Ibid., 19. 
54 Ibid., 26. 
55 Ibid., 54-58. 
56 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 253.   25 
 
(2) The theory that the mystic is misdescribing his experience unintentionally, 
thus needlessly couching the description in contradictory terms; 
(3) The theory that the contradictory predicates are really applicable each to a 
different thing in the experience, but not to the same thing, as the mystic 
says; 
(4) The theory that when the mystic says both X and not-X characterize his 
experience, the word ‘X’ applies in a different sense in each case.
57 
 
It is not necessary to reproduce Stace’s refutations here, but it is interesting to note 
that he merely rejects each proposition as unlikely given the preponderance of mystics 
who insist that their paradoxical descriptions, though contradictory, are entirely 
accurate.  He does not provide a strong proof against these propositions, but attempts 
instead to show how it is much simpler for us to accept that the mystics’ descriptions 
are accurate and that “flat logical contradictions” are perfectly suitable descriptions of 
mystical phenomena.  This essentially unsupported conclusion directly supports 
Stace’s own agenda of legitimizing a perennial monistic mystical experience.  While I 
cannot endorse that claim, I can recognize that Stace makes a good point in refusing to 
explain away the apparent contradictions in mystical language.  There is no reason to 
believe that the authors of such accounts—whether they are reporting first hand or 
not—do not take the same care and consideration in composing their literature as the 
authors of any other genre.  We must therefore unpack the meaning of the language in 
context, understanding it in light of its full possible range of meanings. 
As John McRae states in one of his rules of Zen studies, “romanticism breeds 
cynicism.”
58  I would contend that this rule is commutative, so cynicism also breeds 
romanticism—and both can seriously obscure our view of contemplative traditions.  
McRae is specifically referring to the distortion produced by romanticizing the 
supposed “golden age” of Tang dynasty Chan, and the implicit cynical attitude toward 
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its subsequent “degeneration,” but this kind of distortion is operative anywhere that 
either romanticism or cynicism is practiced.  We must therefore be willing to 
acknowledge all possible levels of meaning in contemplative discourse, even (and 
perhaps especially) those of ostensive meaning, and avoid privileging any one level of 
meaning over another.  If we accept the possibility (as I contend we must) that the 
rhetoric of contemplation and transformation correlates on some level with an actual 
process of change in the appreciation of reality through systems of meaning and 
signification, then we must account for this level of meaning in contemplative rhetoric.  
I will therefore examine how the rhetorical feature of paradox can perform this 
function even while performing more practical functions within the tradition’s 
dynamic of power. 
As an example of the transformative use of paradox I will briefly examine an 
important rhetorical device in the formation of the Chan tradition:  the Mādhyamika 
catus ． kot ． i, or tetralemma, as expounded by the logician Nāgārjuna.  The seemingly 
impenetrable catus ． kot ． i is sometimes used as an example of Buddhist rhetoric that 
negates the use of logic and illustrates the irrationality of emptiness.  In refuting this 
interpretation Frits Staal formulates the most basic criteria of irrationality as being 
logically inconsistent—that is, violating the rule of noncontradiction by affirming that 
two mutually exclusive propositions are both true in the same respect.
59  The catus ． kot ． i, 
as presented by Staal, reads as follows:  “Everything is such as it is, not such as it is, 
both such as it is and not such as it is, and neither such as it is nor such as it is not.  
That is the Buddha’s teaching” (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.8).
60  The apparently 
contradictory phrase is the third term in the tetralemma, “both such as it is and not 
such as it is.”  In the conventional sense, the phrase is indeed contradictory, but the 
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Mādhyamika doctrine of two truths (conventional and absolute) provides two respects 
in which to apply the statement.  Since the rule of noncontradiction requires only that 
two mutually exclusive propositions not be held in the same respect, Nāgārjuna is able 
to make such a statement without being logically inconsistent. 
The last phrase of the tetralemma, “neither such as it is nor such as it is not,” is 
interpreted as a summary rejection of all previous views, and a recapitulation of the 
Mādhyamika project of demonstrating the inapplicability of all views to the reality of 
emptiness.
61  In this respect, the language of the tetralemma serves not only as, “a 
more comprehensive and emphatic way of denying all forms of own-being,” but also 
as a pedagogical or therapeutic device.
62  If an adept completely internalized and 
digested Nāgārjuna’s refutation of all views that admit some form of own-being, and 
arrived at the pervasive, affective conviction of the veracity of the doctrine of no-self, 
such a realization would be tantamount to a new and different apprehension of reality.  
The language of the catus ． kot ． i can therefore rightfully be described as in some sense 
transformative.   
Although the rhetorical feature of the catus ． kot ． i was influential in the formation 
of later Chan thought, a more distinctive example of the tradition’s multivalent use of 
language is found in its characteristic gong’an tradition.  The evolution of this 
tradition as both text and practice begins with early records of encounter dialogues and 
culminates in the Song practice of kan hua or “viewing the [critical] phrase,”
63 which 
continues to be an important element in Sǒn and Zen practice today.  As a major factor 
in defining the Chan tradition it is bound up in issues of ideology and practice, as well 
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as lineage and transmission of authority.  It is therefore a rich example of both the 
transformative and rhetorical uses of language in Chan. 
 
The Significance of the “Encounter Paradigm” in Chan Buddhism 
 
The history of the gong’an as a literary genre is intimately connected with the 
formation of a distinctive Chan identity in the Song dynasty that referenced an 
idealized “golden age” of Chan in the Tang.  John McRae has shown how the 
formation of this identity and the gong’an textual tradition grew out of the Chan focus 
on a genealogical model of authority in the “transmission of the lamp” texts.
64  The 
focus in these texts was on establishing a history for the linear transmission of 
authority between Chan patriarchs, extending back to and deriving authority from 
Śākyamuni and the seven Buddhas of the past.  The model for the transmission of 
authority was therefore expressed in the encounter between teacher and student where 
the teacher would confirm that the quality of the student’s realization was equal to the 
master’s—and by extension, equal to all previous masters in the lineage.  Subsequent 
Chan practice was then informed by this genealogical model of transmission, with 
masters seeking to develop in their students the same realization of enlightenment that 
their own master had aroused in them.  McRae describes Chan in general as, 
“fundamentally genealogical,” and genealogy would come to inform not only the 
institutional and social structures of the Chan establishment in the “climax paradigm” 
of the Song dynasty, but the articulation of its doctrine and the form of its practice, as 
well. 
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Although the genealogical model was extant in the early period of Chan’s 
history, and was invoked in the, “hallmark and culminating text of early Chan,”
65 The 
Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (c. 780), it was not completely systematized 
until, at the latest, the advent of The Anthology of the Patriarchal Hall in 952, which 
is also the first full-blown compilation of encounter dialogue.  The Anthology of the 
Patriarchal Hall is interesting in that it appears, “in effect, as a sudden apparition,” 
and purports to contain transcriptions of actual encounters between famous Chan 
masters and their disciples, in colloquial format, as, “a highly elaborated written 
demonstration of the Chan genealogical schema.”
66  This distinctive literary format 
had its antecedents in both Chinese culture and previous Chan tradition,
67 but it is here 
that it emerges as a self-conscious style.  One of the most important and distinctive 
features of the new style is the incorporation of students’ voices into the exposition so 
that the previous “back room” style of oral exchange could be systematized and 
incorporated into public discourse.  The process of systematization is also important in 
that texts like Anthology of the Patriarchal Hall and Transmission of the Lamp, while 
purportedly capturing the spontaneity and authenticity of the original master-student 
exchanges, actually capture the Chan tradition’s idealization of those exchanges.  As 
another of McRae’s rules of Zen Studies notes, “it’s not true, and therefore it’s more 
important.”
68  These idealized encounter dialogues would come to be a crucial 
linguistic feature of the tradition both in their transformative use in meditative and 
ritual practice and their rhetorical use in modeling the genealogical transmission of 
authority. 
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Later on in the Song dynasty the individual encounters found in the 
“transmission of the lamp” anthologies came to be known by the legal term gong’an 
or “public cases” of enlightenment.  As Dale Wright notes, “just as the records of the 
legal tradition place into the public domain cases manifesting the criteria and 
principles of justice, the ‘public records’ of the Chan tradition announce the criteria 
and principles of ‘awakening.’”
69  Because gong’an were seen to encapsulate (as it 
were) authentic enlightenment experiences, they could be used as examples for study 
and meditation.  The most influential practice of this kind was the method of kan hua 
or “viewing the [critical] phrase” meditation formulated by the Song master Dahui 
Zhonggao.   
In kan hua meditation the teacher gives the student a gong’an to imagine and 
then instructs the student to ruminate upon the huatou or “critical phrase”—usually the 
bizarre or disconcerting response of the master at the end of the gong’an exchange.  
Dahui’s teacher Yuanwu, who compiled the renowned gong’an anthology Biyan Lu 
(Blue Cliff Record), also propagated the idea that gong’an were actually linguistic 
manifestations of Chan masters’ enlightened minds, and hence that all cases were 
equivalent in meaning and even a single phrase (e.g., the huatou) was sufficient to lead 
the student to awakening.
70  Because the huatou is taken as a kind of emanation from 
the enlightened mind of the master, by meditating upon it the student can “trace back” 
this emanation to find the mind’s source and thereby, “know the intent (yi) with which 
[the master] made his response—and, by extension, the enlightened mind that framed 
that intent—and . . . consummate in himself the very same state of enlightenment.”
71  
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In this way the student is made to emulate his teacher and the previous masters before 
him.  This is significant because the gong’an rhetoric works not only to effect a 
change in attitudes and behavior in the student, but also to systematize and regulate the 
process by which he is confirmed as an accomplished practitioner capable of 
instructing pupils himself.   
In later Chan and Zen contexts this master-disciple gong’an (J. kōan) exchange 
would become even more highly ritualized, with the marks of accomplishment coming 
not only from apparent understanding of the patriarchs’ insights, but also from the 
acquisition of the literary acumen needed for ritualized commentarial exchanges.
72  
Bernard Faure describes this literary aspect of the kōan tradition as a kind of game, 
with the standard rules of style in the genre providing the rules of the game in which 
the interlocutors vie for the upper hand.
73  Faure is here suggesting that these 
encounters could and did function on a performative but practical level of 
demonstrating the authority of a teacher over his students, or of increasing an 
individual teacher’s prestige.  This is not to say that Yuanwu was lying or deluding 
himself when he expounded the deeper significance of the huatou, or that the guided 
contemplation thereof could not have a genuinely therapeutic or transformative effect 
on the student, but merely that with systematization there eventually came other more 
practical uses of kōan language.   
The account Robert Buswell gives of contemporary Korean Sǒn hwadu (C. 
huatou) meditation is not significantly different than the kan hua practice advocated 
by Dahui
74, although the monks that undertake the meditation regimen are relatively 
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few.  Buswell estimates that less than five percent of Korean Sǒn monks adopt 
meditation as a vocation,
75 but that these dedicated practitioners are highly regarded 
and, “are treated as the elite vanguard of the monastery.”
76  It is therefore 
reasonable—at least in the case of Korean Sǒn—to take the ostensive meaning of the 
tradition’s contemplative rhetoric seriously and recognize its actual use in the 
transformation of a meditator’s apprehension of the world.  What it is not reasonable 
to do, however, is to take the transformative significance of contemplative rhetoric as 
the only or most important level of significance operative in the lives of Chan 
Buddhists.  Buswell’s account of the Korean case provides an excellent example of the 
relative insignificance of the transformative use of Chan/Sǒn doctrine/rhetoric and its 
actual significance in providing a disciplined life for adherents.
77
 
The distinctive Chan rhetoric developed in the Song dynasty is also important 
to the ordering of the tradition.  Albert Welter argues that the Song period saw not 
only the rise of gong’an discourse but also the canonization of the Chan concept of its 
identity as a, “separate transmission outside the teaching.”
78  This distinctive phrase is 
one of the four axioms or slogans of Chan, said to have originated with Bodhidharma.  
Welter argues, however, that the textual provenance of these four phrases being 
presented together as axioms of Chan dates to a time well into the Song, and that the 
first slogan of, “a special transmission outside the teaching,” is apparently the latest to 
appear.
79  He also posits the invention of the story of the Buddha’s silent transmission 
of the dharma eye to Mahākāsyapa as a tactic aimed at providing scriptural support to 
the Chan claim of special transmission.  This story came to be included in gong’an 
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anthologies like the Wumen Guan (Gateless Barrier), and cited as the historical 
beginning of Chan lineage transmission.
80  This use of gong’an accounts to 
authenticate Chan lineage is taken up by John McRae as one of the important 
organizational uses of Chan rhetoric. 
McRae characterizes the Chan lineage scheme with its attendant mythology of 
a, “separate transmission outside the teachings,” as a, “polemical move, meant to 
establish the superiority of Chan over all other schools.”
81  As such, we may also read 
Chan contemplative rhetoric as validation and reinforcement of the institutional 
structures that sustained Chan’s value on the medieval Chinese Buddhist market (so to 
speak).  Also, by formulating the characteristic “encounter paradigm” for 
authenticating lineage transmissions, the Chan tradition created a mechanism for 
establishing, maintaining, and transmitting the very highest doctrinal authority—
emanating as it did from the Buddha himself.
82  McRae points out how this leveling of 
authority, which placed the Chinese patriarchs at the same theoretical level of status as 
the Buddhas of the past, would be a particularly effective polemical tool in China, 
where Buddhism was originally an Indian import.  The means by which the Chan 
genealogical structure was articulated was the novel genre of encounter dialogue, 
which came to dominate Chan rhetoric and practice. 
McRae stresses how the records of encounter dialogues were formulated and 
presented in such a way as to be taken as actual transcriptions of real conversations—
and not to be taken metaphorically at all.
83  He also notes how the rhetorical style of 
encounter dialogues, “eschews the straightforward exchange of ideas,” and suggests 
that this style reinforces the Chan doctrine of the inherently enlightened nature of the 
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human mind.
84  The sudden awakening idealized in Chan essentially consists of the 
student’s realizing that he is really already enlightened.  McRae suggests that the 
disjunctive style of Chan encounter dialogue serves to radically collapse the traditional 
Buddhist mārga scheme—presumably held by the student in the encounter dialogue 
who seeks help in advancing along the “gradualist” path—into the subitist position of 
sudden enlightenment.
85  The greater point, however, is that the seemingly incoherent 
behavior of the master in such an encounter is a rhetorical representation of the 
ineffability of enlightenment, and as such a mark of the profoundly penetrating insight 
he possesses.   
As the genealogical structure of Chan proliferated throughout the Song, new 
“transmission of the lamp” anthologies were created to record the various branches of 
genealogical relationships flowing out from the main trunk of the linear succession of 
patriarchs.
86  These diversified lineages played a central role in determining eligibility 
for appointments within the monastic administration, where specific lineage affiliation 
was often a prerequisite.  For this reason, and because of their sheer variety, McRae 
posits that the Chan lineage schema, “provided a framework within which to negotiate 
the distribution of power within the monastic institution.”
87 
In practice, the genealogical structure is reinforced, as we have seen, by 
Dahui’s innovative kan hua style of meditation.  While Dahui’s language certainly 
functions transformatively in Chan’s subitist rhetoric, McRae insists that, “more 
important than any subitist rhetorical imperative was the genealogical framework of 
‘viewing the phrase’ Chan—the formulation of the practice in terms of the student’s 
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examination of models of enlightened behavior within his own ancestral lineage.”
88  
This observation, coupled with the idea that through kan hua meditation and 
subsequent responses to gong’an cases the practitioner is meant to emulate the 
enlightened patriarchs in both mind and action, leads to a picture of Chan practice that 
encompasses both the transformative and practical uses of contemplative rhetoric.   
In the transformative use the adept is meant to actually effect a change in his 
attitudes and apprehension of reality, even while reinforcing the doctrinal and 
genealogical structures that provide a context for socio-cultural relationships and 
historical innovation.  The transformative use of the contemplative idiom here is “real” 
in the sense that it is actually meant to change the participant in some way, but both 
because of and in spite of this use it necessarily impacts the social and material reality 
of the tradition by reinforcing traditional patterns of significance.  Along these lines, 
Robert Gimello makes a good point in characterizing Buddhist enlightenment 
[“mystical experience” as it were] as a, “psychosomatic enhancement of religious 
beliefs and values.”
89  At the same time, and as Gimello cautions, it would be 
inappropriate to characterize enlightenment as some sort of delusion.  Even though the 
tradition frames the context and determines the conditions and effects of 
enlightenment, this fact should not be taken as evidence that enlightenment does not in 
fact represent an actual qualitative shift in the personality of the practitioner.  The 
appreciation of the contemplative endeavor as both a genuine impetus to personal 
change and dynamic expression and reinforcement of traditional socio-cultural values 
has been the goal of this essay, and the rich contemplative tradition of Chan Buddhism 
serves as an excellent representation thereof. 
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  In his insightful article, “The Stages of Meditation in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective,” Daniel Brown identifies a common thread of psychological development 
evident across contemplative traditions.  This process of development consists of 
discrete stages that effect a transformation of consciousness in the practitioner.  Brown 
discerns specific psychological effects associated with each stage, but notes that the 
practitioner’s subjective experience of them varies across traditions.  While the 
common psychological events are entirely describable in Western scientific parlance, 
the Hindu and Buddhist practitioners’ experience and subsequent expression of these 
events is entirely colored by their individual doctrinal perspectives.  These varying 
interpretations are entirely consistent with the psychological facts, but also produce 
profound differences in enlightenment experiences between the traditions.  Brown 
concludes, therefore, that cross-culturally among contemplative traditions, “there is 
one path which leads to different ends.”
90   
  While I do think that Brown is on to something, and that the various methods 
of meditation, mindfulness, and prayer found in the traditions I have termed 
“contemplative” probably do produce very similar subjective psycho-physical 
experiences in practitioners, the discussion of their similarity will have to wait for 
another time.  What is interesting about Brown’s survey in the context set by this 
essay is that it represents a possible parallel in cognitive science to the humanistic 
approach of examining cultural patterns of significance connected to the idea and 
process of personal transformation.  Such a parallel, while interesting, is certainly not 
necessary to legitimate the analytic category of contemplative traditions.  In terms of 
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the humanistic study of religion, it simply does not matter whether people of different 
socio-cultural milieus actually experience similar or identical psycho-physical 
phenomenon.  What matters is that at least some of those people use similar styles of 
language and religious practice to articulate the intricate webs of meaning that make 
up their socio-cultural milieu.  Advances in cognitive science and transpersonal 
psychology will likely help us understand why specific referents of contemplative 
language or patterns of practice command the value that they do, but this 
understanding will not change the nature of the comparative project in the cultural 
study of contemplative traditions. 
  As we have seen with the examples drawn from Chan Buddhism, whatever 
subjective psycho-physical effects contemplation is shown to have, it will not diminish 
the material and social force of rhetoric connected with the idiom of contemplation.  
For instance, even though we will never actually know the quality or epistemological 
status of Dahui Zhonggao’s “mystical” experiences, we will be able to draw ever-
better maps for understanding medieval Chinese Buddhism by examining the multiple 
functions and impacts his kan hua meditation had on the historical trajectory of 
Buddhism.  By appreciating the multiple realms of meaning the contemplative idiom 
may command, including the legitimately transformative and transcendent, we can 
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CHAPTER TWO 




The Western conception of alchemy usually revolves around the quest for a 
substance that can transmute base metals into pure gold and grant eternal life:  the 
Philosopher’s Stone.  It is little wonder that the processes of creating gold and 
immortality are linked, since gold itself, which is brilliant and never tarnishes, seems 
to embody eternal vigor and incorruptibility.  Indeed, man has always been drawn to 
its rarity and lustrous properties, and valued it more highly than other metals.  The 
goal of preserving life and even conquering death is likewise a common aim 
throughout history.   
Although people of every area of the world have shared these common 
conceptual concerns, the majority of Westerners do not often associate the art of 
alchemy with cultures or periods outside of medieval and renaissance Europe.  
However, each of the centers of civilization in Europe, the Middle East, India, and 
China have their own alchemical traditions, and all of them share similar goals of 
aurifaction (gold production) and immortality.  The constellation of alchemical 
concepts and valences that I refer to as the alchemical idiom, moreover, has in each 
case lent itself to use by contemplative traditions as a powerful set of symbols 
integrated into the greater contemplative project of personal transformation. 
  It is not clear whether all of these systems of alchemy arose independently, or 
whether there was some cross-cultural influence, but their similarities are often 
remarkable.  All of the traditions use similar apparatus for working with metals and 
minerals, and besides base metals and gold, all of the traditions use mercury as the   43 
 
vital constituent in transmutation.  They also all share a conception of the human 
person as a microcosm of the universal macrocosm, and the concomitant idea that 
changes affected in one can be manifested in the other.  In all of the great centers of 
civilization, metallurgy, glass-making, and other technologies of material manufacture 
were developed relatively early, and it is likely from the techniques of these artisan 
traditions that the practices associated with alchemy arose.  Furthermore, it is only 
after harnessing these techniques to a worldview that allowed a theoretical discovery 
and manipulation of fundamental matter or primal cosmic forces that the dream of 
changing the very nature of substances and transmuting metal to gold and mortal 
bodies to immortal ones becomes plausible. 
  There is some debate about when and where alchemy first appeared, but 
something like it seems to have been present in both Egypt and China from a very 
early date.
1  H. H. Dubs makes an interesting argument for China as the origin of 
alchemy proper, citing the apparent paucity of gold (and therefore also of methods for 
assaying its purity) as a condition for China’s relatively forgiving attitude toward 
aurifaction, and subsequent acceptance of alchemical practices that elsewhere may 
have been more easily dismissed as fraud.
2  In this fertile environment, Dubs argues 
that proto-alchemical metallurgic technology could be wedded to a more abstract 
philosophical system and thereby become more durable and acceptable as a spiritual 
art over and above the dubious enterprise of mere gold-making.  While an interesting 
speculation, Dubs’ argument is not supported by any strong evidence across traditions 
that would indicate China as the clear universal origin of the alchemical project.  It 
also commits the fallacy that I wish to address in this essay that all alchemical 
traditions are necessarily linked by some real historical cross-cultural influence. 
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  The study of alchemy is often marred by the same kinds of fallacious 
connections that plague the study of so-called mystical traditions.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, a more fruitful approach to mysticism, and to alchemy, is to approach these 
traditions not as instances of a recurring cross-cultural and perennial phenomenon, but 
as instances of analytically distinguishable uses of a particular kind of cultural idiom.  
In the present case we do not need to establish any kind of material or historical link 
between widely divergent regions and eras to account for the qualitative similarities in 
alchemical language, but only to note that such similarities exist and constitute a valid 
typology that scholars of religion may use to understand how such alchemical 
language is used to articulate cultural value.  The history of the origins and 
development of the alchemical idiom is a question more for the history of ideas, and 
although it is a very interesting question, it is not one that is necessary to ask in order 
to illustrate the basic character of the alchemical idiom. 
  C. G. Jung took a particular interest in alchemy as he believed that it 
symbolized the process of confronting and transmuting the primal power of the 
unconscious mind into a more refined and completed form of consciousness.  It is not 
necessary to recount Jung’s entire theory of the collective unconscious, but only to 
note his approach to alchemy as a symbolic system serving the contemplative aims of 
certain spiritual traditions.  He believed that the symbolic aspects of the alchemical 
work, and not its actual chemical experiments were the true sine qua non of alchemy.  
Walter Pagel summarizes Jung’s approach: 
 
‘Meditation’ (i.e., an internal dialogue with one’s own unconscious self) 
and ‘imagination’ (i.e., the action of the ‘celestial’ in man, his ‘astrum’) 
will, in the alchemist’s opinion, set free the forces which enable him to 
alter matter.  The process of liberation of the soul from its bodily cage 
(including the unconscious self) that takes place in dreams, visions and 
phantasies appears to be the ‘Philosopher’s Stone’; for the alchemist 
believes that this process, while progressing in his own unconscious   45 
 
self, engenders a similar process of liberation of the ‘spiritual’ in matter.  
The process has become an ‘autonomous complex.’
3 
 
What is interesting here is that Jung offers an explanation of alchemy that focuses on 
the tradition as a contemplative or spiritual art, rather than a technical one.  Pagel also 
notes that many previous conceptions of alchemy ultimately seem unsatisfying 
because they view alchemy essentially only as a kind of “proto-chemistry,” concerned 
solely with chemically manipulating substances to miraculously produce fantastic 
riches.  Unfortunately, as we know now (and as the alchemists, who were no fools, 
certainly knew), mundane chemical process will not and cannot produce gold.  The 
view of alchemy as the misguided precursor to enlightened modern chemistry, 
therefore, reduces alchemy to essential folly, while valorizing and legitimizing modern 
science.
4  The significance of the alchemical magnum opus must be found somewhere 
deeper than its outward appearance of laboratory experiments bent toward aurifaction.  
As Jung suggests, it can be better understood as a symbolic system dealing with a 
contemplative work rather than a purely physical one.  Jung, however, also tends to 
reduce the work of alchemists to the psychology of purely subjective interior states, 
obscuring the wider cultural and intellectual importance of alchemical symbolism. 
  In his work on alchemy, Titus Burckhardt illuminates the symbolic idiom of 
alchemy and its contemplative project.  While making occasional reference to Indian 
and Chinese systems, Burckhardt’s study focuses mainly on the European and Middle 
Eastern Hermetic traditions of alchemy.  While my concern in this essay is not the 
Hermetic traditions, Burckhardt’s approach provides an example of how the 
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significance of alchemical language and symbolism can be located in the 
contemplative project.  Burckhardt argues that Western alchemy was driven by the 
goal of sublimating the alchemist’s soul and discovering therein the Aristotelian 
materia prima, which could then receive the imprint of the universal Spirit or Divine 
Intellect.
5  The outward process of transmuting base metals into gold or silver was but 
the, “metallurgical expression,” of this greater spiritual work.
6   
  As his subtitle suggests, Burckhardt characterizes the alchemical work as an 
essentially cosmological one (as opposed to theological, ethical, etc.)  The meaning is 
that the principles which give shape to the alchemical work—its forms and 
processes—derive from the patterns of signification and correspondence that the 
alchemist finds in the world and in himself.  In all cases, the alchemical idiom has 
power and significance because the practitioner conceives the cosmos as a basically 
congruous whole—and one into which he is entirely integrated.  Cartesian dualism, so 
important to Western Enlightenment prerogatives, tends to hinder our understanding 
of this kind of integrated worldview.  The point Burckhardt makes is that, “alchemy 
acts like a science or art of nature, because for it all states of inward consciousness are 
but ways to the one and only ‘Nature’, which encompasses both the outward, visible 
and corporeal forms, and the inward and invisible forms of the soul.”
7  This means that 
in alchemical traditions, it is not unreasonable to say that, because the cosmic 
principles associated with certain metals and materials correspond to the same 
principles within the mind (or soul) of the alchemist, changes wrought in one will 
necessarily correspond to changes in the other.  In this way it is entirely accurate to 
call alchemy a kind of contemplative tradition; it offers the practitioner a method of 
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ordering and transforming consciousness based on a coherent overarching system of 
cosmology and belief.   
  It is this correspondence of cosmology and contemplative practice within 
alchemy upon which I will focus my presentation of Indian and Chinese alchemical 
traditions.  In so doing, I will show that these two traditions are similar enough in 
goals and practices to justify the use of alchemy as a typological category, but that the 
idea of alchemy as a perennial phenomenon is not justified.  For both examples I will 
give an account of the major cultural, cosmological and philosophical underpinnings 
of the alchemical traditions, and then explore how these ideas are expressed in the 
practices of alchemy.  Finally, I will argue that the alchemical idiom represents a 
strategy for assigning contemplative meaning to certain tangible processes of chemical 
and physical change, and the fact that these processes are necessarily identical the 
world over suggests that a high degree of similarity should be evident even where 
cultural situations are otherwise quite distinct and unrelated.  This similarity, however, 
does not require or even imply any kind of causal or material link between disparate 
alchemical traditions. 
 
Indian Cosmology and Soteriology 
 
  The tantric genius that arose in India around the sixth century CE was, in many 
ways, an innovative extension of orthodox Hindu belief.  The Vedic religion that 
informs all subsequent Hindu belief puts sacrifice at the theoretical and practical 
center of the religious world, and the idiom of sacrifice continues to inform the basic 
vocabulary of all strains of Hindu theology.  The world of the Vedas gave sacrifice 
primacy because it was through the medium of sacrifice that man could interact with 
the world of the gods.   48 
 
  Sacrifice itself is a system of mutual relationship in that it is only by directing 
sacrifice to the gods that man can accrue benefit from such an act.
8  The ideal oblation 
offered in sacrifice, furthermore, is soma, the ambrosia of immortality enjoyed by the 
gods, which, “sustains the gods and maintains their immortality.”
9  Moreover, the 
sacrificer, by the act of sacrificing, enjoys for himself a share of that immortality in the 
form of good fortune and long life.
10  Thus it is the fluid oblation, abstractly identified 
as soma, that took the most important place in sustaining life, and fluid (rasa) that 
would take on many other valences in Hindu thought.  Besides this fluid element, the 
actual working of the sacrifice also included the elements of fire (agni) and wind 
(vāyu).  Fire was what transformed the sacrifice into a form suitable for the gods, and 
wind was what carried it to them.
11  This mode of sacrifice can also be extrapolated 
out to the rest of the cosmos to represent the microcosm of the human being, the 
mesocosm of the mediating sacrifice, and the macrocosm of the rest of the universe.  
These two sets of conceptual categories, “serve as the framework of the entire sweep 
of Indian symbol systems.”
12   
  This statement by David Gordon White, on whose exhaustive work on Indian 
alchemy I will rely throughout this discussion
13, is interesting in that it identifies a 
relatively simple set of triads as the basis for three thousand years of religious 
innovation.  The evidence supporting such a statement is vast, and we will see how 
these valences are born out in the later Hindu alchemical traditions.  He goes on to 
describe how the Brāhmanas carried the sacrificial ideal even further to assert that the 
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sacrifice was, “all that truly matters in the universe.”
14  With this kind of early 
theoretical emphasis, it is only natural that later innovations would share the same 
preoccupations and concerns.  The movement embodied in the Upanishads was 
concerned with how the sacrifice connected the worlds of the human and the divine, 
and found that the entire universe was an emanation of the divine, and that all creation 
could somehow participate in the same Reality, thus condensing the system into 
One.
15  By simply realizing the ultimate equivalence of the human and divine realms, 
this shift into monism explains how a sacrificial action in one realm can be 
immediately realized as action in the other.  
The sacrifice too is internalized in the Upanishads.  Because it is the link 
between the human microcosm and universal macrocosm, it becomes the means by 
which the two can be merged as one—namely through the building up of the internal 
sacrificial fire of tapas.
16  We will see later how the heat of tapas is used to effect the 
realization of the Absolute.  The identification in the Upanishads of the individual 
soul (ātman) with bráhman, the universal or divine soul, implies that there should be 
some mesocosm between its divinity and the humanity of the person’s physical body.  
This connecting factor is the subtle body
17, which will become the space in which the 
sacrifice takes place.   
Two more Indian thought systems that will become important to the discussion 
of alchemy are Āyurveda and yoga.  Āyurveda is the system of Indian medicine based 
on the ordering principles of microcosm and macrocosm.  In this system, because the 
microcosm of the human body is made up of the same five constituent elements as the 
universal macrocosm, any discord between the relative compositions of the two results 
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in health problems in the body.  Both the bodily microcosm and the environmental 
macrocosm, moreover, are governed by three principles which can be correlated to the 
Vedic principles of rasa, agni, and vāyu:  the three bodily humors of phlegm (water, 
śles ． ma), bile (fire, pitta), and wind (vāta), and the macrocosmic forces of moon (rasa), 
sun (agni), and wind (vāyu).   
The body’s three humors (dosas) are also described as motile, fiery, and placid, 
and each governs bodily processes and constituents related to these properties:  for 
instance, pitta is the cause of body heat and allows perception of radiant energy, 
śles ． ma is cooling and provides for the coalescence of semen and other tissues, and 
vāyu courses through the body relating the humors to one another.
18  Āyurveda holds 
that when the body is in the womb, in a non-manifest state, the dosas are completely 
balanced, but when the body is subjected to the imbalances of the outside world they 
can become disordered.  This is because the macrocosmic universe is also composed 
of three homologous “strands” (gunas), which are similarly in a state of equilibrium 
before the universe becomes manifest through divine consciousness and disorder 
arises.
19  We can see from these examples how the three humors are related to the 
three parts of the Vedic sacrifice, as well.  Pitta is equated with agni, and is the means 
by which food can be, “cooked,” by the heat of digestion into rasa, and transformed 
via śles ． ma into the various bodily constituents, eventually yielding semen, while vāyu 
provides the intermediate element and makes the process run.  These conceptual 
elements of the Vedic sacrifice will become important later on, but it is the process of 
refinement that is of most immediate application to alchemy.   
In the process of digestion, the food one consumes is transformed by the 
actions of the dosas into seven increasingly refined bodily constituents (dhatus), of 
                                                 
18 D. M. Bose, ed., A Concise History of Science in India, (New Delhi:  Indian National Science 
Academy, 1971), 240. 
19 White, The Alchemical Body, 21.   51 
 
which rasa is the first and most raw and semen (or uterine blood, in women) the last 
and finest.
20  In this way the raw material of all kinds of food and drink and medicine 
and whatever else one eats is transformed into potent sexual fluid.  As we have seen 
before, sexual fluid is afforded great importance in Indian thought, and is equated with 
soma, the gods’ ambrosia of immortality.  Āyurveda is therefore also preoccupied with 
the promotion of semen’s wellbeing. 
Because it takes a long time and much raw material to produce even a single 
drop of semen
21, Āyurveda is concerned with conserving semen and preventing its loss.  
Yoga, meanwhile, is concerned with the conservation of semen because it is, “the sine 
qua non of yogic practice:  semen is the raw material and fuel of every 
psychochemical transformation the yogin, alchemist, or tantric practitioner 
undergoes.”
22  In the hatha yoga system, semen (rasa) is collected in the cranial 
vault—the microcosmic moon and center of male cooling power—and in the process 
transformed into liberating nectar (amr ． ta).  Meanwhile, in the lower abdomen, there is 
the female, solar, center which provides the heat that drives yogic practice.  This 
bipolar system is a homologue of the macrocosmic system of sun and moon, light and 
dark, hot and cold, male and female, etc. and informs all of the tantric systems we will 
see.  It is also important to note that bipolarity is completely consistent with the 
primacy placed on the Vedic triad of rasa, agni and vāyu, in that rasa and agni occupy 
opposite poles in this symbol system, as well. 
The sun and moon also play opposite roles in the temporal cycle of the year.  
Since the sun represents agni and the moon rasa, the hot, dry season is dominated by 
the desiccating action of the sun, and the cooler wet season is dominated by the 
                                                 
20 Bose, A Concise History of Science in India, 242. 
21 White, The Alchemical Body, 25-26. 
22 Ibid., 27.   52 
 
“wetness” of the moon.
23  The desiccation and re-moistening of the macrocosm caused 
by the sun and moon directly impact rasa in the microcosm, and this duality impacts 
Āyurveda because it represents a systematic disorder of the macrocosm that affects the 
bodily microcosm and must be counteracted accordingly.  Similarly, in yoga the 
female principle is capable of drying out and destroying the male semen, so there is an 
emphasis on retaining semen, even in sexual practice.  This fact gives some context as 
to why the erotic practices of tantra were seen as dangerous.  Because the moon is 
associated with rasa/soma/semen, which is the sustaining force of immortality, the 
cycles of the moon also play a large role in the yogic system. 
The lunar cycle is divided into sixteen kalas, or digits, representing the fifteen 
nights of a lunar fortnight, plus one extra kala to represent the whole and to, “perfect,” 
the number.
24  The kala is a measure of both substance and time, and is a kind of unit 
for parts of a whole.  The number sixteen appears in the yogic notion of the subtle 
body as two sets of sixteen digits:  one associated with the sun and one associated with 
the moon.
25  Normally the solar digits, which are distributed in the abdomen and up 
the central channel (sus ． umnā) are dominant and work in a temporal cycle that “cooks” 
the body, thus aging it.  Yoga seeks to use the semen concentrated in the abdomen and 
its opposing cycle as a counteragent to these fires, moving it up the central channel, 
piercing the six cakras which represent elements of coarse existence, thus producing 
heat and “cooking” or purifying the semen into amr ． ta (nectar), which fills the cranial 
vault to its full capacity of sixteen lunar digits, and effectively reverses time and 
cheats death.
26  Tantric traditions made the innovation of using the female energy 
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itself, the kund ． ． alinī, to do the piercing on its way up the central channel to union with 
its consort Śiva, the microcosmic moon in the cranial vault. 
Indian religion maintains a vast body of symbolism with a dizzying array of 
valences, making a definitive account of all the levels of meaning relevant to alchemy 
practically impossible.  The wide range of interpenetrating thought systems also 
makes it difficult to make universal assertions about cosmology and philosophy.  The 
broad range of ideas outlined above, however, can be taken as a preliminary sketch of 
the cultural episteme that the Indian alchemical tradition inhabits.  The alchemical 
idiom in India draws on these well-established themes to offer its own understanding 




Alchemy rose to the height of its popularity in India in the medieval period in 
close association with Tantrism.
27  Up until that era, there was little evidence to 
suggest that alchemy was anything more than a mythical tradition of magical elixirs 
and superhuman powers.
28  The medieval period also saw the blossoming of the tantric 
traditions, and it was the tantrikas that became the largest proponents of alchemy.  
Ultimately, alchemy became the domain of the Siddhas, that group of tantric mystics 
who claim lineage from the various perfected beings of yore.
29  Because alchemical 
practices were not the sole heritage of any one group in India, however, it is difficult 
to systematize an account of them.  Furthermore, some scholars suggest that the reason 
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alchemy began its rise in textual popularity in the period between the third and seventh 
centuries CE was due to the increased amount of cultural exchange with China, whose 
alchemical tradition was already well established by that point.
30  David Gordon White, 
however, finds that, “the Indian material is so specifically Indian . . . as to preclude 
any possibility of this being a matter of wholesale borrowing.”
31  White is here 
referring to the tenth-century flourishing of tantric alchemy proper, and notes later that 
in the seventh century, there is actually evidence of Chinese interest in acquiring 
Indian alchemical knowledge.
32  It seems as though the exchange more than likely 
went both ways, and it is more to the point to examine how Indian alchemy was so, 
“specifically Indian,” namely in its contemplative significance. 
Since both are primarily within the domain of tantric ascetics, the practices of 
alchemy and hatha yoga are best seen as, “parallel and interpenetrating systems.”
33  
Both practices are informed by the same cosmologies and soteriological goals, share 
much of the same terminology and are often similar in practice.  Indeed, the 
Rasarnava, of which White makes extensive use as a prime example of a tantric 
alchemical text, states, “As in metal, so in the body . . . By means of the Work, a 
stable body is attained.  Mercury and breath [control] are known as the Work in two 
parts (karmayogo dvidhā).”
34  Both parts of the Work are mesocosmic systems 
through which the practitioner interfaces with the divine, eventually merging with it 
and attaining perfection and immortality.  The focus of the present investigation, 
however, is alchemy in particular.  Therefore, I will examine one extensive alchemical 
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process—the purification of mercury through the series of alchemical sam ． skāras—to 
illustrate the shared themes of both traditions. 
The alchemical sam ． skāras (purifications or “perfectionings”) are analogous to 
the yogic sādhanas (realizations), and prepare the mercury for its goal of transforming 
base metal into gold and of transforming the alchemist’s gross body into a perfected 
alchemical one, just as the sādhanas prepare the yogin for perfection of the subtle 
body and integration into ultimate Reality.  There are different numbers of sādhanas 
and sam ． skāras, and indeed different textual traditions identify many different sets, but 
White breaks the process for both into four general categories of actions:  purification, 
immobilization, reversal, and transformation.
35  This compartmentalization makes it 
easy to compare similar themes, so I will retain and reproduce it here, as well.   
The first category of purification involves the processes of cleaning and 
preparing the mercury that will be used in the alchemical operations (both physically 
and chemically), and also cleansing and preparing the body of the alchemist to 
properly receive the end product of his work.
36  This purification regimen has its roots 
in the Vedic fire sacrifice, in preparation for which the venue of sacrifice would be 
ritually purified.  This was done to return the space to a primordial state of wholeness 
so that it could act as mesocosm in the action of the fire sacrifice itself.
37  The 
purification process of mercury ensures that the material used for the ensuing 
transformation will be the same substance originally created in the earth as the seed of 
Śiva, and thus capable of properly undergoing alchemical processes.  Likewise, in the 
Āyurvedic tradition, in preparation for rejunvenative therapy, the patient would first be 
purged of the offending substances that caused an imbalance in humors, so that the 
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restorative therapy could be efficacious.
38  In yoga and alchemy the gross body of the 
practitioner is purified in similar ways to ensure a properly working reflective 
mesocosmic medium.
39  By purifying the body, the yogin cleans the channels of the 
subtle body so that he can freely circulate the vital breaths through them, and the 
alchemist removes any impurities that could adversely affect the laboriously prepared 
mercurial elixir he will ingest.
40 
The next stage of immobilization includes all of the alchemical processes of, 
“swooning,” “binding,” and, “killing,” the purified mercury.  It is not necessary to 
examine each one in great detail, but it will suffice to say that White’s categorization 
of these processes as, “immobilization,” is entirely apt.  In different ways, each of the 
three processes stops mercury from being volatile so that it can be further manipulated.  
In many ways, this is the most difficult alchemical process to achieve, and the rest of 
the processes follow rather naturally once it has been done.
41  White notes that several 
alchemical texts (and one yogic text) contain the same key phrase, “Swooned, rasa, 
like breath, drives away diseases, killed it revives itself, bound it affords the power of 
flight.”
42  This points to the importance of this principle in both alchemy and yoga; the 
difference between the two is the meaning of rasa as mercury and semen, 
respectively.
43  In both contexts, the benefits of immobilizing rasa are the same as 
those of immobilizing breath.  Both alchemical and hathayogic traditions emphasize 
the immobilization of breath and rasa as essentially interchangeable, since it is only 
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by achieving stillness of breath that the alchemist’s procedures will be effective and 
the yogin will still his semen.
44   
The necessity of immobilization is directly related to the concepts microcosmic 
and macrocosmic cycles.  As we saw before, solar and lunar cycles are the 
macrocosmic embodiment of the disorder caused when the universe became manifest, 
and in Āyurveda are seen to cause disorders of the human microcosm.  Similarly, in 
yoga, it is the participation of semen in the destructive cycle dominated by the solar 
polarity in the body that causes aging.  For the yogin to work against this cycle and 
implement a new, constructive lunar cycle for his semen, he must first halt the 
progression in the destructive cycle by immobilizing breath/rasa.  The alchemist must 
do the same thing to mercury by halting its progression toward volatility and preparing 
it for constructive transformation.  It is at this point in the alchemical process that 
mercury is really entirely purified as a mesocosmic medium.  Only by immobilization 
is it made truly pure in its original state of potential. 
Because the three modes of immobilization of mercury are all different, they 
produce mercury in different forms.  Swooned mercury is often combined with sulfur, 
and bound mercury can be bound together with other components.
45  The results of all 
of these concoctions are useful medicinal compounds, but the most potent result 
comes from killing mercury, which reduces it to ashes.  In Āyurvedic pharmacology, 
killing metals is the most common way of administering them because it is believed 
they are more easily absorbed by the body that way.
46  Furthermore, because ashes are 
the end product of the sacrificial combination of rasa, agni, and vāyu, and because 
mercury is the semen of Śiva, the rasa par excellance, “the reduction of mercury . . . 
to ash is tantamount to the recovery of a primordial perfection, of the absolute before 
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its fall into nature, into manifestation.”
47  The ash thereby produced is a potent elixir in 
itself, since it is charged with primal energy.  The primacy of ash is a common theme 
in tantric traditions because of the traditional importance placed on it by Śiva himself, 
who smears it on his body and reduces the world to ash in his purificatory dance of 
destruction with Śakti. 
The next category of alchemical transformation, reversal, involves several 
sam ． skāras, culminating with the process of jarana, “assimilation,” in which twelve 
successively large amounts of sulfur or mica (the mineral Śakti to mercury’s Śiva) are, 
“swallowed,” by the alchemical mercury, resulting in mercury, “possessed of fantastic 
powers of transmutation.”
48  This process is the alchemical equivalent of the yogic 
practice of raising the semen through the central channel and piercing the cakras, 
which collapses each successively subtle constituent of the human microcosm into the 
next, finally collapsing all into the mind, and the mind into the Absolute.
49  The yogic 
raising of the kund ． ． alinī has a similar operation, except that the cakras and constituent 
parts of the universe are identified as sounds, and they are collapsed into Śiva-
consciousness, the source of all vibration.
50  Mercury prepared in this way only has to 
undergo a few more processes, namely the addition of some grains of gold, silver, or 
gemstones before it is ready to transmute base metals into gold.  Once the threshold of 
saturation is reached, the mercury will automatically reach the final alchemical stage 
of vedha, where it “pierces” the base metal it has consumed and instantly transforms it 
into gold.
51 
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The sam ． skāra of vedha, along with the formal terminus of sarira-yoga (“body 
Work,” which is simply the ingestion of the product of the last stage by the alchemist), 
constitute the transformation category.  Once the alchemical mercury pierces the base 
metal, all of its base constituents are obliterated, leaving only pure gold.  This is 
similar to what happens to the human body when the same alchemical pill is ingested 
(or, more commonly, simply held in the mouth).  Here, the mercury does the same 
work as yogic austerities and, “implodes,” all of the successive base elements, 
represented by the cakras, and leaves only the fifth, most subtle element of ether.
52  
The presence of ether alone creates a space of emptiness and pure potentiality, where 
the only other thing left is the ātman, principle of the Absolute, which can then 
spontaneously come forth to constitute the new alchemical or perfected body.
53  The 
perfected rasa of the alchemical mercury replaces the gross rasa of the physical body.  
This is the same process that occurs at the culmination of hatha yoga and the raising 
of the kund ． ． alinī, except that the perfected rasa in that case is the nectar produced 
when the refined seed fills the cranial vault or when kund ． ． alinī reunites with the male 
principle at that same locus.
54  Thus the culmination of the alchemist’s art is the same 
as that of the tantric yogin. 
As is clear from the preceding description of the alchemical process, the 
project is only one part of the “Work in two parts.”  Yogic discipline and 
contemplation are integral and necessary parts of the alchemical process.  The 
cosmological and soteriological concepts from which the alchemical idiom draws its 
meaning were already well established in India by the time alchemy became popular 
in the medieval period.  It also rose to prominence within the religious climate of 
medieval tantrism, which can further account for the religious currency afforded to 
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many of its symbols.  Although alchemy in India had much in common with the more 
“objective” or “empirical” pursuits of medicine and metallurgy, it would be 
irresponsible to impose upon medieval India modern concepts of what is “scientific” 
and what is “unscientific.”  Alchemy, therefore, should be seen in light of the cultural 
values it would actually have commanded in its most prominent eras.  It is clear from 
its close conceptual proximity with tantric yoga that alchemy was a specific genre of 
theory and practice within the greater Indian contemplative world.  Its features of 
chemical transformation are directly allied with the soteriological goals of personal 
transformation and manipulation of the subtle parts of the universe, which are the 
common property of Indian contemplative traditions in general.   
 
Daoist Cosmology and Soteriology 
 
Daoist cosmology and soteriology is based in large part on greater 
philosophical currents common to all Chinese culture, but because Daoism 
nonetheless developed in this milieu, I will treat them as part of the Daoist system.  
There are many concepts at work in the Daoist system that are similar to those of the 
Indian traditions, and these should be fairly obvious.  Since my project here is to 
characterize Chinese alchemy as a particular idiom in use within the Daoist 
contemplative milieu, however, I will simply present a brief description of the system 
in this light.
55   
To understand Daoist cosmology we must begin at the beginning:  the Dao.  
The Dao is the ineffable principle of primal existence.  As such, it is present in 
everything, but completely and definitely elusive as an ontological reality.  The word 
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dao means, “way,” and it is in this sense of a path that it is often understood as the 
principle upon which the universe is conducted.  The Dao is, in a sense, an ordering 
principle, but not merely an ordering principle.  As Kristofer Schipper puts it, the Dao 
is:   
 
“something underlying the change and transformation of all beings, the 
spontaneous process regulating the natural cycle of the universe.  It is in 
this process, along this way, that the world as we see it, the creation of 
which we are an integral part, finds its unity.”
56 
 
He goes on to admonish the reader not to take the Dao itself as unitary.  “The 
Dao may make the whole, but is not itself the Whole.”
57  This is a significant 
distinction because it differentiates the cosmology of Daoism on a fundamental level 
from that of theistic systems like tantric Hinduism.  The universe in Daoism is seen as 
a Whole that is ultimately caused by differentiation from the primal unity of the Dao, 
but that ensuing universe is not what makes up the Dao.  What is the universe made of 
then?  This question is answered by the common cosmological view shared by all 
systems of early Chinese thought.
58 
Chinese metaphysics is fundamentally concerned with time, and more 
specifically cyclical time.
59  The temporal cycles of all things commonly encountered 
in the world, like life, growth and death, the seasons, day and night, etc. were seen as 
parts of the greater whole of astronomical time, which was also clearly cyclical.  All of 
these varying scales of temporal cycles fit inside each other, “nested” in a cohesive 
way.
60  Thus it is implied that the regulation of the universe, the macrocosm, was 
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directly analogous to the human lifespan or any other discrete cyclical system, the 
microcosm.  The principle that imparted regularity to the cosmos, furthermore, must 
then impart the same kind of order to the human microcosm.  As Eva Wong puts it, 
“there is a macroscopic/microscopic relationship between the Dao in nature and the 
Dao in humanity.  This is because all things originate from the same source (the Dao) 
and follow the same principles.”
61  The Daoist myth of cosmic origins is relatively 
simple, and although it is not shared by every school of thought in ancient China, it 
does use the same system of explaining the physical interaction of the constituents of 
the phenomenal universe. 
The first chapter of the Daodejing has it that, “the Dao gives birth to the One, 
the One to the Two, the Two to the Three, and the Three to the Ten Thousand 
Beings.”  The Ten Thousand Beings (wanwu) here are all the constituents of manifest 
reality.  Traditional Chinese metaphysics fleshes out this idea to explain that the 
universe was originally made up of Primordial Chaos (hundun), an undifferentiated 
matrix of potential qi (breaths, energies, constituents of matter) that was subject to the 
action of the Dao.
62  When this action happened, the Primordial Chaos differentiated 
into separate qi, which then coalesced into Heaven (made of the lighter, transparent qi) 
and Earth (made of the heavier, opaque qi), and joined at the Center, which makes up 
the third element in the system.
63  The system of Three, as alluded to above, forms 
myriad differentiated qi, which make up all of the substances in the material world.  
All the while the Dao is active in guiding change in cyclical time, and the constitution 
of the system is governed by the dynamic of change that is the Dao.   
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As Schipper puts it, “the two fundamental phases of the Dao’s action are yin 
and yang, graphically . . . the shady side and the sunny side of the mountain.”
64  Yin 
and yang are thus polar opposites in the spectrum of the Dao’s action.  They 
correspond conceptually to all diametrically opposed pairs, but metaphysically are 
likened specifically to the, “repose” (yin), and, “movement” (yang) of the 
power/action (de) of the Dao.
65  This power fluctuates between the two poles, and 
leads to the first of the so-called, “laws,” of ancient Chinese cosmology/physics:  “any 
maximum state of a variable is inherently unstable.”
66  The meaning here is that, in the 
spectrum of yin and yang, when one reaches its apogee, it necessarily reverts to its 
opposite, which results in a wave-like continuum of yin and yang that has five distinct 
segments:  two apogees of yin and yang, two states of flux, and one equilibrium.
67  
These five points of the wave-like flux of yin and yang correspond to the five 
constituent elements of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth.   
Schipper continues, “the five phases are found in everything, and their 
alternation is the second physical law.  The phases lead from one to the other.”
68  The 
cycle of phases alluded to is the cyclical motion of the yin-yang polarity, and there are 
both constructive and destructive cycles, depending on the direction of flux.  
Everything in the material world is composed of a certain distribution of these 
elements, which changes according to the grand cyclical time of the Dao, thus 
changing the composition of the things.  Things which share the same elemental 
disposition, moreover, are subject to, “symbolic correlation,”
69 where change in one is 
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able to affect change in the other.  This is most applicable to alchemy in the 
movements of the planets, which each correspond to a different element and can affect 
change in metals and other earthly materials correlated to their element.
70  This 
principle also reiterates the primacy of the macrocosm/microcosm dynamic in Chinese 
cosmology.
71 
The five elements are really more accurately called phases, because they are 
actually just phases in the flux of the Dao, manifested by yin and yang.  The actual 
physical building blocks of the material world are the qi.  In this context, qi is both a 
physical material constituent and an energetic one.  Everything in the world is made 
up of qi, including the human body and the human spiritual element, as well as all 
other spiritual beings.  In practice, these qi are equated with spirits or essences, which 
to a large degree have a life of their own.  The human governing qi, hun, can leave the 
body while it is asleep, travel to heaven, etc., while the po, which make up the 
skeleton and other heavy body parts, conspire to keep the person tied to earth.
72  The 
spiritual components of humans are thus not ontologically different from that of the 
gods—the only difference is in the level of refinement and power of their constituent 
qi (which in this case is called shen).  Because all of the qi are subject to change, the 
human spirit can, in theory become empowered (or diminished).  This leads us to the 
third, “law,” of ancient Chinese physics:  “that every body that goes through a 
prolonged and repeated cyclical action is transmuted and purified.”
73  This effect is 
directly applicable to alchemy, both exterior and interior, and it will become very 
important later. 
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Finally, the goal of Daoist alchemy, and Daoist soteriology in general, is also 
bound up in the tradition’s cyclical cosmology.  Thomas Michael characterizes the 
Daoist soteriological goal as, “a return to the original wholeness, necessitating a 
reverse progress backward through the sequences [of cosmic differentiation].”
74  
Returning to an original state of simplicity and spontaneity is indeed the broad 
soteriological goal of Daoism in general.
75  The Daoist contemplative idiom works 
toward this goal by creating systems of meaning in which this goal may be realized.  
As we will see, the Daoist alchemical project is one specific subset of this 




Alchemy in Daoism is denoted simply by the word for cinnabar, dan, and is 
divided into the two strains of outer alchemy (wai dan) and inner alchemy (nei dan).
76  
The two branches of the alchemical tradition have most likely shared a similarly long 
tradition, but up until about the eleventh century CE, outer alchemy commanded more 
popularity, and afterwards inner alchemy dominated.
77  Because much of the 
terminology and theory of interior alchemy grew out of the exterior tradition, let us 
first examine wai dan.
78 
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Outer alchemy, like all alchemical traditions, was interested in discovering the 
method for transmuting base metals into gold, and for brewing the elixir of 
immortality.  However, Chinese alchemy’s method does not necessarily seek to do 
anything counter to nature or even specifically artificial.  Rather, it seeks to work with 
the natural cyclical order to purify and sublimate various materials.
79  The third “law” 
of ancient Chinese physics mentioned above implies that if one could find a way to 
speed up cyclical time, one could perfect and transmute materials much more 
efficiently.  Indeed, the aim of Chinese alchemy is to, “refine raw ingredients found in 
nature and thus to discover the ultimate and fundamental element, the seminal essence 
of the world.”
80 
Minerals in general in Chinese cosmology, including metals, had the same 
theoretical, “life-cycle,” as all other beings, which consisted of changes in 
composition over long periods of time.
81  The alchemical process, then, was a 
microcosmic condensation of time by orders of magnitude.
82  The alchemist could do 
the work that would take nature thousands of years in a matter of days.  Because of the 
principle of symbolic correspondence mentioned above, the alchemist was also 
himself symbolically living out that enormous lifespan, so that when his cyclical 
transmutation of cinnabar into pure yang energy was complete, he could use the 
accumulated efficacy to gain immortality.
83  The yang side of the energy equation is 
important here because life, beginning with one’s conception as a fetus, was the yang 
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part of a dualistic cycle, which peaked at maturity and descended into the yin side at 
death.  Thus, in order to stay in this life indefinitely, one would have to be immune 
from the effects of waning yang energy, hence the need for an elixir to reestablish and 
maintain it.  There is, however, another option, the same one that Heaven uses to 
remain immortally constant:  the attainment of, “a perfectly balanced internal phasing 
which attunes [one] to the Dao’s recurrent pattern.”
84  The perfection of this balance, 
and the generation of the resulting perfected body of immortality, is the work of 
interior alchemy, which Russell Kirkland describes as, “a method of moral and 
spiritual self-refinement:  through the proper knowledge and action, one could pare 
away the grosser elements of one’s being and eventually ascend to a higher plane of 
existence.”
85 
The theories and practices of inner alchemy are closely related to what 
Kristofer Schipper translates as, “Keeping the One.”  This is a traditional phraseology, 
and the practices it describes include various breathing, dietary, and exercise regimens 
like qigong, abstention from grains, and taijiquan to promote and maintain a healthy 
balance of qi in the body and prolonging the life of the practitioner.  The second-third 
century classic Book of the Yellow Court (Huangting Jing) describes these methods for 
Keeping the One, and also provides an overview of the interior landscape of the 
human microcosm.  This landscape is rich and varied, and finds in the human body all 
the structures homologous to the outside world—mountains, rivers, palaces, etc.  The 
One referred to in Keeping the One, Schipper asserts, is the true self that resides in the 
country of the bodily microcosm.
86  The Book of the Yellow Court also describes the 
sexual practice of the Union of Qi, which is one of many Daoist sexual practices.  
Although more advanced than the basic principles of diet and breath control, sexual 
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practice is still considered a preliminary in the practice of Keeping the One, since it 
also acts to, “bring order and equilibrium to the body.”
87 
The more advanced state of union with the Dao is experienced through Chaos 
rather than well-regulated order.  This is the process involved in Inner Alchemy proper, 
which is, “a synthesis of all the earlier rituals.”
88  Nei dan does, in fact, parlay 
breathing into its preliminary practice, and as the medieval era progressed and wai dan 
declined, the focus became transmuting the energies of the body through continuous 
cycles of, “orbiting,” qi.
89  The inner alchemy Schipper describes, however, is more 
focused on the return to the origin of the Dao through the obliteration of duality. 
The work of inner alchemy is essentially focused on giving oneself over to the 
pure potentiality of primordial chaos, and creating formless unity within the bodily 
microcosm through processes analogous to those of alchemy.  The “reagents” of inner 
alchemy are the yin and yang or the elements of water and fire, and the elixir produced 
from the alchemical process is the embryonic body of the One—the true transcendent 
self.  The reagents are united at the center of the microcosm to produce a unity that 
becomes all-pervasive.
90  This marriage of, “true lead,” and, “true mercury,” within 
the alchemical apparatus of the practitioner’s body forms the, “mysterious pearl,” of 
the immortal embryo, which grows as it’s yang power waxes (as it does with all 
embryos), and transmutes the practitioner into an Immortal.
91  In this way, sexual 
union, which is embodied by the union of yin and yang, “is united at the Center and 
from this Center it radiates and spreads through the whole body.  Love thus engages 
the body as a whole, merging all the organs and all the functions.”
92  In this way the 
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cosmic flux of the Dao can manifest itself in the entire being of the practitioner, 
creating an experience of Chaos, beyond all notions of subject and object, which 
changes the dynamic of sexual union to one of gestation, and forms the embryo of the 
true self, the One. 
In this process we see the principle of return, or backward motion through time.  
As mentioned earlier, because life is itself a fluid cycle of yin and yang, the moment of 
conception is a point of equilibrium between the two phases.
93  Thus the return to the 
origin that takes place after mystical union is achieved can be seen as a return to this 
state of primordial equilibrium.
94  In inner alchemy, this return is also effected by a 
practice called, “embryonic breathing,” which seeks to reverse the flow of breath in 
the body (the normal cycle of which leads towards death), and thereby reverse cyclical 
time back to the embryonic equilibrium.   
No matter what the language used to describe this return, it is a fundamentally 
contemplative process in that it involves the radical re-ordering of normal conceptual 
processes.  It is also the culmination of the Daoist path, alchemical or otherwise.  The 
alchemical idiom serves the purposes of articulating these soteriological values, while 




The alchemical project is a unique and intriguing feature of premodern 
societies.  Alchemical methods of transmuting metals and minerals involve precise 
laboratory work under carefully controlled conditions, and these methods are meant to 
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be repeatable and their results are meant to be empirical manifestations of the 
fundamental properties of the physical universe.  For these reasons, many interpreters 
of the alchemical traditions have found in alchemy the institutional seeds of modern 
experimental chemistry.  At the same time, the alchemists themselves did not seem to 
revise their conception of fundamental physical properties as they accumulated 
empirical data.  Rather, alchemy continued to be grounded in the metaphysics and 
cosmology formulated in religio-philosophical spheres, even in spite of seemingly 
overwhelming proof that its project was fundamentally flawed—namely, the fact that 
many of its elixirs are in fact deadly poisons.  In this respect alchemy is fundamentally 
un-scientific.  Indeed, it is anachronistic to assume any kind of conceptual divide 
existed in premodern societies between so-called “rational” (i.e. scientific or proto-
scientific) investigation, and philosophical or contemplative speculation.   
Alchemical traditions must, therefore, be approached from within the socio-
cultural milieu that created them and from which they draw their cultural currency.  In 
taking this approach it is plain to see that alchemy is not a perennial phenomenon, but 
rather that it is a peculiarly similar way for contemplative traditions to concretize very 
abstract religious or cultural values by attaching them to tangible physical materials 
and processes.   
In the Indian and Chinese cultural spheres, religious and philosophical 
innovations provided worldviews that were conducive to the project of alchemy.  As 
we have seen, these two traditions share many similar concepts and practices, but I 
propose that their similarities are mostly coincidental.  For instance, both traditions 
have concepts of paired opposites that affect the dynamics of alchemical systems, and 
these pairs are often the same:  fire and water, sun and moon, cold and hot, etc.  
However, the symbol systems associated with the polar opposites are not nearly the 
same in both traditions.  For instance, Indian and Chinese alchemy both deal with   71 
 
lunar and solar cycles, but the Indian system equates the moon with the male principle 
and the sun with the female; the Chinese system is exactly opposite.  Very basic 
differences like these cannot be simply swept away by appealing to their superficial 
similarities.  Even where all of the alchemical traditions (including Hermetic ones) 
seem to share near-identical symbolism, the meaning and cultural resonance of that 
symbolism is still radically different across traditions.   
For instance, in all cases the final alchemical product can roughly be described 
as the undifferentiated stuff of primordial existence (materia prima, śakti, hundun), 
but that “stuff” can carry very different meaning depending on the context.  The 
understanding of the materia prima of the Hermetic traditions conjures images of a 
hierarchical universe of forms, culminating in the perfect form-giving Divine Intellect.  
The prakriti of the Indian milieu is tied to a view of the universe as a concentric series 
of emanations from the godhead in the form of sound or vibration.  The understanding 
of hundun in the Chinese context connotes primordial chaos to which the Dao brings 
rhythmic order.  Each tradition is fundamentally different in its cosmological ordering 
of the universe, which affects how the alchemical project is pursued. 
The Indian metaphysical perspective is concentric, while the Chinese is 
cyclical.  In the Hindu cosmology we have seen associated with both alchemy and 
hatha yoga, the manifest world is seen as an emanation from the godhead.  I call this 
arrangement concentric because reality is seen to proceed outward in concentric levels 
of subtlety from the central ordering principle of divinity.  In this kind of system, a 
return to the original unity of divine consciousness entails a retraction of the 
concentric levels against their outward emanation.  This concept is what produces the 
alchemical and yogic process of, “collapsing,” successive levels of gross reality to 
achieve unity with the divine.  In the Daoist system, the universe is fundamentally 
ordered by cyclical time and by extension, cyclical systems of matter/energy.  Here,   72 
 
the soteriological aim is to merge completely with the principle of this cyclic change 
itself, the Dao, not to transcend it.  This concept is what yields the alchemical process 
of microcosmic manipulation of time, and the contemplative inner alchemical process 
of returning to the One. 
As the Daoist inner alchemical tradition progresses, especially into the modern 
era, its techniques of breathing and circulating breath become increasingly, “yogic.”
95  
While there are indigenous Chinese systems of breath control, and a medical tradition 
of charting out the channels of breath, the practice itself at some point begins to take 
on a qualitatively more Indian flavor.  In the modern period, when communication 
between India and China was much more extensive, this influence seems natural, if 
not inevitable.  As mentioned earlier, there is also evidence of alchemical 
conversations between India and China beginning in the early part of the first 
millennium CE.  Furthermore, India most likely received the majority her mercury for 
alchemical processes from China, where the mineral wealth of mercurial ores was 
much greater.
96  Because of this and other economic exchanges in allied practical 
fields like metallurgy, it seems more reasonable that the majority of applicable 
intellectual exchange was in technical not philosophical knowledge.  This kind of 
exchange would allow both cultures to utilize the physical technology of the time to 
pursue their own alchemical projects, which would be entirely grounded in the native 
intellectual tradition.  Regardless of the level of practical interaction, the fact that 
similar methods and materials were used in both Indian and Chinese alchemy 
necessarily means that there will be a high degree of similarity. 
Mercury, whether it is located in India, China, Egypt or Europe, is still 
mercury.  Likewise, sulfur is still sulfur and gold is still gold.  Gold, when purified by 
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a goldsmith is just as lustrous in the West as it is in the East, and the chemical fact 
remains that mercury is one of the few substances that easily reacts with gold.  All 
early metallurgists and other such craftsmen must have observed exactly the same 
physical and chemical properties of minerals, regardless of their geographic location 
or philosophical attitudes.  What was certainly quite different across the globe, 
however, was the deeper meaning they took from these identical processes.  The 
physical-chemical starting conditions for every example of alchemy would have been 
the same, so it is only natural that each culture’s interpretation of those conditions 
would bear certain similarities with one another.  It would be a mistake, however, to 
assume that these similarities must necessarily be linked together, either by esoteric 
communication of alchemical secrets across vast distances or by some perennial 
alchemical affinity in man.   
The more reasonable approach to the curious phenomenon of alchemy is to 
treat it as a peculiar way of investing meaning—usually within the context of 
contemplative discourse—in concrete physical phenomena.  Interestingly, once these 
physical phenomena were invested with such meaning, they could eventually become 
new symbols for other levels of significance.  The trend in India and China toward 
“interiorizing” alchemical processes may be the result of just such a process.  
Alchemy itself became a rich context of contemplative meaning and formed a new 
kind of idiom which contemplative traditions could use to formulate doctrine and 
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